Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56924 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorSuzuki, Toruen
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-08-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:31:50Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:31:50Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56924-
dc.description.abstractAgents compete to solve a problem. Each agent knows own computational capacity as private information and simultaneously chooses either a risky or a safe problem solving method. This paper analyzes the optimal prize schemes from the perspective of the prize designer who wishes to find a solution as quick as possible. It is shown that (i) the winner-take-all scheme can induce excessive risk taking and make problem solving slower (ii) prize schemes with milder competitive pressure induce the optimal risk taking and quicker problem solving.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2010,083en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordoptimal prize schemeen
dc.subject.keywordrisk takingen
dc.subject.keywordproblem solvingen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwAnforderungsprofilen
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen
dc.subject.stwRisikopräferenzen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCompetitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn641291116en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
503.08 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.