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dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren
dc.contributor.authorLevati, M. Vittoriaen
dc.contributor.authorMontinari, Nataliaen
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-24-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:28:25Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:28:25Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56832-
dc.description.abstractWe introduce a procedurally fair rule to study a situation where people disagree about the value of three alternatives in the way captured by the voting paradox. The rule allows people to select a final collective ranking by submitting a bid vector with six components (the six possible rankings of the three alternatives). In a laboratory experiment we test the robustness of the rule to the introduction of subsidies and taxes. We have two main results. First, in all treatments, the most frequently chosen ranking is the socially efficient one. Second, subsidies slightly enhance overbidding. Furthermore, an analysis of individual bid vectors reveals interesting behavioral regularities.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2012,005en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelD02en
dc.subject.jelD71en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordbidding behavioren
dc.subject.keywordprocedural fairnessen
dc.subject.keywordvoting paradoxen
dc.subject.stwGruppenentscheidungen
dc.subject.stwRanking-Verfahrenen
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsparadoxonen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.subject.stwSubventionen
dc.subject.stwSteueren
dc.titleRanking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: A theoretical and experimental analysis-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn68747017Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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