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dc.contributor.authorKeenan, Donald C.en
dc.contributor.authorNaqvi, Nadeemen
dc.contributor.authorPech, Geralden
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-10-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-04T13:55:32Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-04T13:55:32Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56549-
dc.description.abstractThis paper characterizes, under the most general conditions to date, the steady-state equilibria of a symmetric, two-country trade model in which countries move in alternating-move, dynamic either tariffsetting or quota-setting games in Markov Perfect strategies, and compares the respective equilibrium level of tariffs and quotas with the corresponding pairs in the equilibria of static games. Our results imply that the alleged non-equivalence of the outcomes of tariff-retaliation (neither free trade nor autarky) and quota-retaliation (asymptotic autarky) games in the literature depends crucially on complete myopia, and can be dismissed altogether once dynamic considerations are introduced in an operationally significant manner.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aPhilipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics |cMarburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics |x44-2011en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordforeign trade policyen
dc.subject.keywordtariffen
dc.subject.keywordquotaen
dc.subject.keywordretaliationen
dc.subject.keyworddynamic gameen
dc.subject.keywordMarkov perfect equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordsupermodular gamesen
dc.subject.stwAußenwirtschaftspolitiken
dc.subject.stwZollpolitiken
dc.subject.stwAußenhandelskontingenten
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Spielen
dc.subject.stwMarkovscher Prozessen
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleA theory of dynamic tariff and quota retaliation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn671915606en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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