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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56161
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Blonski, Matthias | en |
dc.contributor.author | Spagnolo, Giancarlo | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-03-28T13:04:58Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-03-28T13:04:58Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2001 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56161 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We find that contrary to common perception, cooperation as equilibrium of the infinitely repeated discounted prisoner's dilemma is in many relevant cases not very plausible, or at least questionable: for a significant subset of the payoff-discount factor parameter space cooperation equilibria are strictly risk dominated by non-cooperation (according to the Harsanyi-Selten 1988 criterion). Examples include collusion equilibria in the repeated Cournot duopoly. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aStockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |cStockholm | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x437 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Prisoner's Dilemma | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Risk dominance | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Repeated games | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Equilibrium selection | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Cooperation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Collusion | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gefangenendilemma | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Prisoners' other dilemma | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 333195701 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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