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dc.contributor.authorHyee, Raphaelaen
dc.contributor.authorRobledo, Julio R.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-09T14:06:33Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-09T14:06:33Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55165-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a two period family decision making model in which spouses bargain over their contributions to a family public good and the distribution of private consumption. In contrast to most models in the literature, specialization within the couple emerges endogenously from the production of the public good, and is not caused by exogenous differences between the spouses. Increasing marginal benefits of labour market experience make specialization efficient, even if both spouses have equal market and household productivities on the outset. If spouses are not able to enter into a binding contract governing the distribution of private consumption in the second period, the spouse specialized in market labour cannot commit to compensate the other spouse for foregone investments in earnings power. As a consequence, this spouse may withdraw part of his/her contribution and the provision level of the household good is likely to be inefficiently low.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aQueen Mary University of London, Department of Economics |cLondonen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x640en
dc.subject.jelD19en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordfamily bargainingen
dc.subject.keywordspecializationen
dc.subject.keywordprivate provision of public goodsen
dc.subject.stwFamilienökonomiken
dc.subject.stwArbeitsteilungen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsangeboten
dc.subject.stwHaushaltsproduktionen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungenen
dc.subject.stwScheidungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleSpecialization in the bargaining family-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn594025265en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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