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dc.contributor.authorLiang, Qiaoen
dc.contributor.authorHendrikse, George W. J.en
dc.contributor.authorHuang, Zuhuien
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-02-
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-09T15:33:38Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-09T15:33:38Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/52694-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines how farmers producing differentiated quality products choose different governance structures in a non-cooperative game between farmers, enterprises, and consumers. A cooperative and an IOF (investor owned firm) coexist in equilibrium and low quality is delivered by the cooperative. The trade-off between pooling and the elimination of the double markup determines the attractiveness of cooperatives compared to IOFs.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aLeibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO) |cHalle (Saale)en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIAMO Forum 2010, Halle (Saale), June 16 - 18, 2010: Institutions in Transition - Challenges for New Modes of Governanceen
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelL22en
dc.subject.jelQ13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordQualityen
dc.subject.keywordCooperativesen
dc.subject.keywordInvestor-Owned Firmsen
dc.titleQuality provision and governance structure variety: Pooling versus double markup-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn676455646en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:iamo10:52694en

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