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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/48125
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Choi, Jay Pil | en |
dc.contributor.author | Thum, Marcel | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-07-13T10:43:58Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-07-13T10:43:58Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2003 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48125 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper develops a simple framework to analyze the links between corruption and the unofficial economy and their implications for the official economy. In a model of self-selection with heterogeneous entrepreneurs, we show that the entrepreneurs' option to flee to the underground economy constrains a corrupt official's ability to introduce distortions to the economy for private gains. The unofficial economy thus mitigates government-induced distortions and, as a result, leads to enhanced economic activities in the official sector. In this sense, the presence of the unofficial sector acts as a complement to the official economy rather than a substitute. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aTechnische Universität Dresden, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften |cDresden | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics |x02/03 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D9 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H2 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K4 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L1 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | corruption | en |
dc.subject.keyword | shadow economy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | official economy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | self-selection | en |
dc.subject.stw | Korruption | en |
dc.subject.stw | Schattenwirtschaft | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wohlfahrtseffekt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Corruption and the shadow economy | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 82209035X | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:tuddps:0203 | en |
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