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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Brandes, Julia | en |
dc.contributor.author | Schüle, Tobias | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-02-21 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-09-24T14:42:27Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-09-24T14:42:27Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier.pi | urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-27968 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40321 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper contributes to the debate on the efficacy of IMF's catalytic finance in preventing financial crises. Extending Morris and Shin (2006), we consider that the IMF's intervention policy usually exerts a signaling effect on private creditors and that several interventions in sequence may be necessary to avert an impending crisis. Absent of the IMF's signaling ability, our results state that repeated intervention is required to bail out a country, where by additional assistance may induce moral hazard on the debtor side. Contrarily, if the IMF exerts a strong signaling effect, one single intervention suffices to avoid liquidity crises. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aEberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |cTübingen | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aTübinger Diskussionsbeiträge |x310 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F33 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | catalytic finance | en |
dc.subject.keyword | debtor moral hazard | en |
dc.subject.keyword | global games | en |
dc.subject.stw | Anpassungsprogramm des IWF | en |
dc.subject.stw | Internationale Finanzierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Signalling | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gläubiger | en |
dc.subject.stw | Auslandsverschuldung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Moral Hazard | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Welt | en |
dc.title | IMF's assistance: Devil's kiss or guardian angel? | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 558771386 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:tuedps:310 | en |
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