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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Wohlschlegel, Ansgar | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-11T08:53:09Z | - |
dc.date.available | start=2010-08-11T08:53:09Z; end=2010-10-26 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37495 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Wholesale contracts with loyalty-rewarding pricing schemes are of particular concern in legal cases of abuse of market power. Competition authorities complain that an incumbent manufacturer may use the lock-in effect of such long-term contracts with a retailer to impede subsequent entry or even prevent it. This paper analyzes an incumbent manufacturer using a long-term contract to shift rent from an entrant who can produce only in later periods. If contracts can only be made contingent on total own quantities, the incumbent's pre-entry (post-entry) quantity will be excessive (inefficiently small) even under the otherwise most general set of contracts. The model permits the analysis of simple pricing schemes widely used in practice. In particular, I show that all-unit discounts outperform incremental discounts both from the incumbent's and a social point of view, although competition authorities tend to take a more skeptical view towards the former. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M. | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Regulation and Pricing Policies |xF8-V1 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D80 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K21 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L42 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Abuse of Market Dominance | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Discounts | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Exclusive Dealing | en |
dc.title | Loyalty-Rewarding Pricing Schemes: Contract Space and Rent Shifting | - |
dc.type | Conference Paper | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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