Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37476
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Roider, Andreas | en |
dc.contributor.author | Englmaier, Florian | en |
dc.contributor.author | Mühlheusser, Gerd | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-11T08:56:15Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-08-11T08:56:15Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37476 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We investigate a moral hazard model with a one-sided commitment problem. That is, after effort provision, the agent is free to either stay with the principal or to leave and pursue his (ex-post) outside option, the value of which is increasing in effort. Depending on parameters, optimal contracts have interesting properties, such as first-best effort incentives, nonresponsiveness to underlying parameters, or inefficient separation. Moreover, the agent might suffer from a ceteris paribus improvement of his outside option. Potential applications of this framework include employment relationships and venture capital financing. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M. | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Asymmetric Information and Incentives |xA8-V1 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K31 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M52 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | moral hazard | en |
dc.subject.keyword | limited commitment | en |
dc.subject.keyword | ex-post outside option | en |
dc.subject.keyword | limited liability | en |
dc.title | Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave | - |
dc.type | Conference Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 655840753 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Datei(en):
Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.