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dc.contributor.authorLehmann, Stefanie Anielaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-29-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-29T10:08:36Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-29T10:08:36Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37026-
dc.description.abstractIn the context of principal-agent theory risk is largely seen as a source that causes inefficiencies and lowers incentives and accordingly is not in the principal’s interest. In this paper I compare two different designs of a collective tournament where output in a team is generated through a particular two-stage production process. I show within a theoretical tournament framework that risk in terms of chance is beneficial from the point of view of a profit maximizing principal who organizes the tournament. Selecting an agent randomly that has to work at the final stage after all agents exerted effort at the first stage helps the principal to overcome a trade-off in incentive provision he faces when selecting the agent who works at the final stage before the tournament starts. This trade-off causes optimal efforts to be lower in a tournament without random selection compared to a tournament with random selection. As the higher efforts overcompensate additional wage costs the principal earns higher expected profits when selecting the agent that has to work at the second stage randomly after the first stage.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x19/2008en
dc.subject.jelD2en
dc.subject.jelJ3en
dc.subject.jelM5en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcollective tournamenten
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen
dc.subject.keywordrandomizationen
dc.subject.keywordrisken
dc.subject.stwGruppenarbeiten
dc.subject.stwExtensives Spielen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwRisikoen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleWhen Randomization in Collective Tournaments is Profitable for the Principal-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn60334061Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:192008-

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