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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kirchkamp , Oliver | en |
dc.contributor.author | Reiss, J. Philipp | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-10-29 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-14T11:12:45Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-14T11:12:45Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31716 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We present results from a series of experiments that allow us to measure overbidding and, in particular, underbidding in first-price auctions. We investigate how the amount of underbidding depends on seemingly innocent parameters of the experimental setup. To structure our data we present and test a theory of constant markdown bids. While a fraction of bidders can be well described by Bayesian Nash equilibrium bids, a larger fraction seems to either use constant markdown bids or seems to rationally optimise against a population where some members use markdown bids and some are rational. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJena | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aJena Economic Research Papers |x2008,066 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C92 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D44 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Auction | en |
dc.subject.keyword | experiment | en |
dc.subject.keyword | overbidding | en |
dc.subject.keyword | underbidding | en |
dc.subject.keyword | risk-aversion. | en |
dc.subject.stw | Auktionstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Risikoaversion | en |
dc.subject.stw | Test | en |
dc.title | Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and markdown bidderstheory and experiment | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 583849091 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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