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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31298
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Neyman, Abraham | en |
dc.contributor.author | Okada, Daijiro | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-03-08 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-14T11:02:16Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-14T11:02:16Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31298 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects equilibrium outcomes of repeated games, and, as a special case, we study the repeated games with nonstationary bounded recall. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aRutgers University, Department of Economics |cNew Brunswick, NJ | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWorking Paper |x2005-14 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C73 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Bounded Rationality | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Strategy Set Growth | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Strategic Complexity | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Nonstationary Bounded Recall | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Repeated Games | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Entropy | en |
dc.subject.stw | Soziale Beziehungen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Beschränkte Rationalität | en |
dc.subject.stw | Zeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wiederholte Spiele | en |
dc.subject.stw | Entropie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Growth of strategy sets, entropy and nonstationary bounded recall | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 508623774 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:rut:rutres:200514 | en |
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