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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Clark, Derek J. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Sand, Jan Yngve | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-01-15 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-01-25T16:34:14Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-01-25T16:34:14Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | |aEconomics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal|c1864-6042|v4|h2010-1|nKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)|lKiel|y2010|p1-48 | en |
dc.identifier.pi | doi:10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2010-1 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/29632 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyses endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners produce complementary technology advancements, although firms do not co-operate on R&D investment level or in the product market. The equilibrium coalition outcome is either between the two most efficient firms, or a coalition with all three firms. The two-firm coalition is the preferred outcome of a welfare maximising authority if ex ante marginal cost is sufficiently high, and the threefirm coalition is preferred otherwise. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium outcomes result in the lowest total R&D investment of all possible outcomes. Aircraft engine manufacturing provides a case study, and indicates the importance of antitrust issues as an addition to the theory. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKiel | en |
dc.subject.jel | L11 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L13 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | R&D | en |
dc.subject.keyword | endogenous coalitions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | asymmetric firms | en |
dc.subject.stw | Industrielle Forschung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Forschungskooperation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Koalition | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verhandlungstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Forschungskosten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wohlfahrtseffekt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Konzentrationspolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Flugzeugantrieb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Welt | en |
dc.title | Endogenous technology sharing in R&D intensive industries | - |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 616556527 | en |
dc.rights.license | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:ifweej:20101 | en |
econstor.citation.journaltitle | Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal | en |
econstor.citation.issn | 1864-6042 | en |
econstor.citation.volume | 4 | en |
econstor.citation.issue | 2010-1 | en |
econstor.citation.publisher | Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) | en |
econstor.citation.publisherplace | Kiel | en |
econstor.citation.year | 2010 | en |
econstor.citation.startpage | 1 | en |
econstor.citation.endpage | 48 | en |
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