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dc.contributor.authorAvrahami, Judithen
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren
dc.contributor.authorKareev, Yaakoven
dc.contributor.authorUske, Tobiasen
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-13-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:39:51Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:39:51Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25662-
dc.description.abstractWhen two or more agents compete for a bonus and the agents' productivity in each of several possible occurrences depends stochastically on (constant) effort, the number of times that are checked to assign the bonus affects the level of un-certainty in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn, is expected to increase the efforts made by competing agents (Cowen and Glazer (1996), Dubey and Hai-manko (2003), Dubey and Wu ( 2001)). Theoretical predictions were derived and experimental evidence collected for the case of two competing agents, with the bonus awarded to that agent who outperforms the other. Levels of uncertainty (sampling occasions of productions, 1 or 3), cost of production (high or low), cost symmetry (asymmetric or symmetric), and piece-rate reward were manipulated factorially to test the robustness of the effects of uncertainty. For control, a sin-gle-agent case was also theoretically analyzed and empirically tested. The re-sults indicate that, for tournaments, greater uncertainty does indeed lead to greater than expected effort and lower unit variable costs.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2007,093en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelM42en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.jelM55en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordMonitoringen
dc.subject.keywordTournamenten
dc.subject.keywordIncentivesen
dc.subject.keywordUncertaintyen
dc.subject.keywordStochastic Production Technologyen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwRisikoen
dc.subject.stwLeistungskontrolleen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleOn the incentive effects of uncertainty in monitoring agents: a theoretical and experimental analysis-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn55407043Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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