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dc.contributor.authorEllingsen, Toreen
dc.contributor.authorMiettinen, Topien
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-22-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-27T09:21:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-27T09:21:10Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25607-
dc.description.abstractCan two negotiators fail to agree when both the size of the surplus and the rationality of the negotiators are common knowledge? We show that the answer is affirmative. When the negotiators can make irrevocable commitments at a low but positive cost, the unique symmetric equilibrium entails disagreement with high probability. In the unique pair of pure strategy equilibria, one party gets all the surplus. Even though we impose no constraints on side-payments, efficient compromises are unattainable. A strongly asymmetric authority relationship is thus the only viable alternative to costly conflict.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2007,037en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordAuthorityen
dc.subject.keywordBargainingen
dc.subject.keywordCommitmenten
dc.subject.keywordDisagreementen
dc.subject.keywordTransaction Costsen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwVertragen
dc.subject.stwKonflikten
dc.subject.stwTransaktionskostenen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDisagreement and authority-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn547124554en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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