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dc.contributor.authorBarbie, Martinen
dc.contributor.authorPuppe, Clemensen
dc.contributor.authorTasnádi, Attilaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:29Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:29Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22863-
dc.description.abstractWe characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Arrow's ``independence of irrelevant alternatives" condition. Under a weak richness condition, these domains are obtained by fixing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations (``Condorcet cycles"). We then ask on which domains the Borda count is non-manipulable. It turns out that it is non-manipulable on a broader class of domains when combined with appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules. On the other hand, we also prove that the rich domains on which the Borda count is non-manipulable for all possible tie-breaking rules are again the cyclic permutation domains.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x13/2003en
dc.subject.jelD71en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordBorda counten
dc.subject.keywordscoring methodsen
dc.subject.keywordnon-manipulabilityen
dc.subject.stwUnmöglichkeitstheoremen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleNon-Manipulable Domains for the Borda Count-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn382890000en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:132003-

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