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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Barbie, Martin | en |
dc.contributor.author | Puppe, Clemens | en |
dc.contributor.author | Tasnádi, Attila | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-29T15:10:29Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-29T15:10:29Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2003 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22863 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Arrow's ``independence of irrelevant alternatives" condition. Under a weak richness condition, these domains are obtained by fixing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations (``Condorcet cycles"). We then ask on which domains the Borda count is non-manipulable. It turns out that it is non-manipulable on a broader class of domains when combined with appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules. On the other hand, we also prove that the rich domains on which the Borda count is non-manipulable for all possible tie-breaking rules are again the cyclic permutation domains. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x13/2003 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D71 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Borda count | en |
dc.subject.keyword | scoring methods | en |
dc.subject.keyword | non-manipulability | en |
dc.subject.stw | Unmöglichkeitstheorem | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Non-Manipulable Domains for the Borda Count | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 382890000 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:bonedp:132003 | - |
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