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dc.contributor.authorFahrholz, Christianen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T14:52:04Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T14:52:04Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22129-
dc.description.abstractExchange-rate policies of Central Eastern European Countries (CEEC) have often been a subject matter. Yet, some new insights in terms of political economy considerations upon exchange-rate policy are provided. It is pointed out that it is more appropriate to analyse exchange-rate policy in course of Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) with regard to a changing incentive structure. In doing so, considerable moral hazard problems become apparent. ERM II shall provide for an adequate level of convergence between prospective and current members of European Monetary Union (EMU). However, this institutional arrangement and, particularly, its impact on the incentives for exchange-rate policy making might enable CEEC to load considerable costs of convergence onto current members. Accordingly, the phase of ERM II is considered to be a bargaining on the distribution of costs of convergence between prospective and current members of EMU. In return, accession countries would offer to maintain public support for European integration. The CEEC' leverage in this bargaining rests on brinkmanship, i.e. putting exchange-rate regimes at risk, thus possibly undermining the according public support. This paper delineates the basic assumptions and conditions for successful brinkmanship, points out the specific transmission mechanisms, and characterises this kind of exchange-rate policy as 'threaten-thy-neighbour'. Overall analysis results in a cautious outlook on probable effects of such strategic exchange-rate policies on European institutional and economic matters.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFree University Berlin, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEzoneplus Working Paper |x14en
dc.subject.jelE0en
dc.subject.jelF0en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordbrinkmanshipen
dc.subject.keywordexchange-rate policyen
dc.subject.stwWechselkurspolitiken
dc.subject.stwEuropäischer Währungsverbunden
dc.subject.stwWechselkursrisikoen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden
dc.subject.stwEU-Erweiterungen
dc.subject.stwEuropäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunionen
dc.subject.stwOsteuropaen
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen
dc.titleStrategic Exchange-Rate Policy of Accession Countries in ERM II-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn393743233en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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