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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18071
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Borck, Rainald | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:39:10Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:39:10Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2003 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18071 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capital endowment is smaller than average. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDIW Discussion Papers |x335 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H77 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | tax competition | en |
dc.subject.keyword | voting | en |
dc.subject.stw | Steuerwettbewerb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Steuersystem | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.subject.stw | Abstimmungsregel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Tax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Model | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 849707862 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp335 | en |
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