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dc.contributor.authorJamison, Julian C.en_US
dc.description.abstractIn economic situations a player often has preferences regarding not only his or her own outcome but also regarding what happens to fellow players, concerns that are entirely apart from any strategic considerations. While this can be modeled directly by simply writing down a player's final preferences, these are commonly unknown a priori. In many cases it is therefore both helpful and instructive to explicitly model these interactions. This paper, building on a model due to Bergstrom (1989, 1999), presents a simple structure in the context of game theory that incorporates the synergies between players. It is powerful enough to cover a wide range of such interactions and model many disparate experimental and empirical results, yet it is straightforward enough to be used in many applied situations where altruism, or a baser motive, is implied.en_US
dc.publisherFederal Reserve Bank of Boston Boston, MAen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series // Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 11-15en_US
dc.subject.keywordinterdependent preferencesen_US
dc.titleGames with synergistic preferencesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

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