Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/55552 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers No. 11-15
Verlag: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, MA
Zusammenfassung: 
In economic situations a player often has preferences regarding not only his or her own outcome but also regarding what happens to fellow players, concerns that are entirely apart from any strategic considerations. While this can be modeled directly by simply writing down a player's final preferences, these are commonly unknown a priori. In many cases it is therefore both helpful and instructive to explicitly model these interactions. This paper, building on a model due to Bergstrom (1989, 1999), presents a simple structure in the context of game theory that incorporates the synergies between players. It is powerful enough to cover a wide range of such interactions and model many disparate experimental and empirical results, yet it is straightforward enough to be used in many applied situations where altruism, or a baser motive, is implied.
Schlagwörter: 
altruism
interdependent preferences
fairness
cooperation
JEL: 
C72
D03
D64
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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