Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/61729 
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
SFB 373 Discussion Paper No. 1999,66
Publisher: 
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, Berlin
Abstract: 
In this paper we present an experiment on the false consensus effect. Unlike previous experiments, we provide monetary incentives for revealing the actual estimation of others' behavior. In each session and round sixteen subjects make a choice between two options simultaneously. Then they estimate the choices of a randomly selected subgroup. For half of the rounds we provide information about other subjects' choices. There we find no false consensus effect. At an aggregate level, subjects significantly underweight rather than overweight their choices. The results are difficult to interpret for the rounds where we do not provide information.
JEL: 
C91
D83
D84
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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