

Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin

**Working Paper**

## The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given

SFB 373 Discussion Paper, No. 1999,66

**Provided in Cooperation with:**

Collaborative Research Center 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, Humboldt University Berlin

*Suggested Citation:* Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin (1999) : The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given, SFB 373 Discussion Paper, No. 1999,66, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, Berlin, <https://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-1004655>

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/61729>

**Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:**

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

**Terms of use:**

*Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.*

*You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.*

*If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.*

# The False Consensus Effect Disappears if Representative Information and Monetary Incentives Are Given<sup>α</sup>

Dirk Engelmann<sup>γ</sup> & Martin Strobel<sup>z</sup>  
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

July 8, 1999

## Abstract

In this paper we present an experiment on the false consensus effect. Unlike previous experiments, we provide monetary incentives for revealing the actual estimation of others' behavior. In each session and round sixteen subjects make a choice between two options simultaneously. Then they estimate the choices of a randomly selected subgroup. For half of the rounds we provide information about other subjects' choices. There we find no false consensus effect. At an aggregate level, subjects significantly underweight rather than overweight their choices. The results are difficult to interpret for the rounds where we do not provide information.

JEL-Classification: C91, D83, D84

---

<sup>α</sup>We thank Werner Güth, Thomas Heße, Steffen Huck, Ulrich Kamecke, Daniel Klapper, Manfred Königstein, Hans Normann and Wolfgang Scholl for helpful comments and Klaus Abbink and Abdolkarim Sadrieh (1995) for providing RatImage which was used to implement the experiment software. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through Sonderforschungsbereich 373 and by the Deutsche Girozentrale - Deutsche Kommunalbank is gratefully acknowledged.

<sup>γ</sup>Institut für öffentliche Wirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, D-10178 Berlin, Germany, FAX: +49-30-2093 5787, phone: +49-30-2093 5788, e-mail: engelman@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

<sup>z</sup>Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie III, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, D-10178 Berlin, Germany, FAX: +49-30-2093 5704, phone: +49-30-2093 5724, e-mail: strobel@wiwi.hu-berlin.de

# 1 Introduction

The 'false consensus effect' has frequently been reported in social psychological research. The term was first used by Ross et al. (1977). Mullen et al. (1985) report 115 studies which show a false consensus effect. It has also been observed in several experiments conducted by economists, although these were not designed to test for this effect.<sup>1</sup> Most of the studies employed a definition similar to that used by Mullen et al. (1985):

False consensus refers to an egocentric bias that occurs when people estimate consensus for their own behaviors. Specifically, the false consensus hypothesis holds that people who engage in a given behavior will estimate that behavior to be more common than it is estimated to be by people who engage in alternative behaviors.

In 1989 Dawes (1989 & 1990) realized that this type of definition does not justify the label 'false'. He argues that it is perfectly rational to use the information about one's own decision, behavior, or whatever else is being considered in the same way as the information about any other randomly selected sample of size one. The effect is only false if too much weight is assigned to one's own decision. We will therefore refer to the effect as defined above as a consensus effect and use the following definition of a false consensus effect which is both stricter and more appropriate:

A (truly) false consensus effect is considered to be present if people, when forming expectations concerning other people's decisions, weight their own decision more heavily than that of a randomly selected person from the same population.

In contrast to the definition cited above this implies that a false consensus effect can be considered as a bias in a Bayesian framework. It would improve our ability to predict human behavior greatly if we could discover systematic deviations from rational expectations, like the false consensus effect, and if we could quantify them. The inclusion of a false consensus effect in game theoretic models can yield interesting insights and results (see e.g. Engelmann, 1998). Whether the false consensus effect can be shown to be present even in terms of the stricter definition is therefore of interest to economists.

A reevaluation of several studies using the strict and appropriate definition has shown that most of the studies did not find such a (truly) false

---

<sup>1</sup>See for example Selten & Ockenfels (1998) or Jacobsen & Sadrieh (1996).

consensus effect, but that they quite often found an effect in the opposite direction (see Dawes, 1990). Sherman et al. (1984) found a (truly) false consensus effect only when the self-image is threatened. Krueger and Clement (1994) found a false consensus effect even in the presence of other information. So when the strict definition of the false consensus effect is applied, empirical results are rather ambiguous.

Furthermore, most studies do not even allow testing for a (truly) false consensus effect since they do not provide any option for comparing how the knowledge about one's own decision is weighted relative to information about other people's decisions. Often the only attempt to evaluate the falsity of the effect is to assume a uniform prior belief about possible decisions and then compare the posterior belief actually expressed to what would be obtained by rational Bayesian updating using a sample of size one (see Dawes, 1989, and Krueger and Clement, 1994, for details). However, we consider the assumption of a uniform prior belief in this context totally arbitrary and unjustifiable.

Hence we set out to conduct an experiment which, without needing to use unjustifiable assumptions or sophisticated statistical methods, allows a simple test to be made to see if knowledge about the own decision is weighted more heavily than information about other people's decisions.

Our experiment also avoids further shortcomings of previous experiments. One of these is that the information, if provided, was often taken from some general survey. The latter is problematic if, for example, students' behavior is what is being estimated and the subject herself is a student. In this case it is justifiable that she puts more weight on her own behavior than on the information provided. To avoid this problem we provided information from the same population whose behavior was to be estimated later.

From the perspective of an experimental economist, most social psychological experiments on the false consensus effect are also unsatisfactory for methodological reasons. This is primarily due to the fact that no incentives for revealing the true beliefs are provided. Our study (like that of Omerman et al. (1996) who examine the presence of a false consensus effect in a public good experiment) differs by providing clear (monetary) incentives for revealing the true beliefs. The relevance of incentives in this context is demonstrated by Omerman et al. (1996). In a post-experiment questionnaire 50% of their subjects stated that they would have answered differently if no incentives had been provided.

Furthermore, in many of the social psychological experiments where information about others people's decisions is provided, this information is rigged and the subjects are clearly deceived. These experiments are therefore unsatisfactory. Apart from general concerns about this practice which we do

not want to discuss at this point (see Camerer (1996) for a general discussion), it is quite obvious that, in some studies, subjects might have become suspicious about this information and thus might have discarded it. In the present study subjects were not deceived.

16 rounds were played in each session of the present experiment. In each round subjects first had to choose between two options and then estimate how some of the other subjects in the same session had chosen. They were informed before the estimation step about the first step choices of the remaining subjects in half of the rounds. Monetary incentives for true revelation of both preferences and beliefs were provided, since payoffs were based on the number of correct estimates and transformed through the first step choices of half of the rounds. (See the following section for details.)

We found a clear consensus effect both when we provided information and when we did not as did most studies of the false consensus effect (see e.g. Mullen et al., 1985). Where we provided information about other subjects' decisions, the information was clearly used. Although subjects definitely assigned some positive weight to their own decision when estimating that of other subjects in the same session, on average this weight was even lower than that assigned to the decisions they were informed about. Hence the consensus effect we found was not a false consensus effect. In the rounds where we did not provide representative information testing for a (truly) false consensus effect is problematic, since the effect of the own decision on the estimation cannot be compared with the effect of representative information simply because there isn't any. Consequently, our results for these items are difficult to interpret.

In the next section we describe the experimental design. Section three contains the experimental results, followed by the conclusion.

## 2 Experimental Design

In the present experiment 16 subjects played 16 rounds simultaneously on a computer network.<sup>2</sup> Each round consisted of three steps. In the first step each subject chose between two options of an item (Decision 1). One item, for example, was the question: "What do you eat more frequently, oranges or bananas?" Another allowed the subjects to donate DM 1,- to the non-government organization "amnesty international". (See Appendix C for the complete list.) The second step began with the random assignment of four (different) subjects to each individual subject. In half of the rounds

---

<sup>2</sup>That the number of subjects equals the number of rounds is a mere coincidence and of no significance to the experiment.

		With Information	Without Information
Payo $\alpha$ Relevant	Morally Relevant	Rich-Poor (6) Donation Chapel(15)	Public Good (4) Donation ai (9)
	Morally Irrelevant	Lottery (7) Time Preference (10)	Payo $\alpha$ System (3) Stamps (14)
Not Payo $\alpha$ Relevant	Morally Relevant	Free-Riding (2) Waiter (16)	Tax Evasion (5) Exam (12)
	Morally Irrelevant	Fruit (1) Months (13)	Writing (8) Elevator (11)

Table 1: Decision items 2  $\times$  2  $\times$  2 design. The numbers in brackets correspond to the order in which the items were presented to the subjects. For details see Appendix C.

subjects were then informed about these four subjects' Decisions 1 without identifying them. For the other rounds subjects received no information. The task in the third step was to estimate the remaining eleven subjects' Decisions 1 (this is called Decision 2). Subjects were informed that the random matching was conducted independently for each subject and for each round. This procedure ensured that the information subjects were provided with was from the same population as the subjects whose decisions they were to estimate. No feedback about the success in Decision 2 was provided before the experiment was completed so as to prevent learning across items.

We implemented a 2  $\times$  2  $\times$  2 design with respect to the items (see Table 1). Items differ in terms of payo $\alpha$  relevance, moral relevance, and whether the subjects received information about the decisions of the four other participants.

The distinction between "with information" and "without information" allows us to compare the traditional way of measuring the (false) consensus effect with the approach we consider more appropriate. The traditional way compares estimates given in Decision 2 by subjects who chose one option in Decision 1 to estimates given by subjects who chose the other option in Decision 1 (see e.g. Ross et al., 1977). This does not require information. The more appropriate way is to compare the weights given to the own Decision 1 and to that of a randomly chosen person in the same population when making Decision 2.

The distinction between morally relevant and irrelevant items gives us the opportunity to investigate whether the (false) consensus effect has an ego-defensive function, for example: "I do free-ride on public transport, but everybody does." If this were the case, the effect should be larger for morally

relevant items than for morally irrelevant items. Sherman et al. (1984) ...nd evidence for this hypothesis which is doubted by Alicke and Largo (1995).

An alternative explanation for the phenomenon usually labeled false consensus effect could be that it is not a distortion of the expectations about other people's decisions but rather an adaptation towards the perceived decision of the majority. This effect could be based on a desire to comply with perceived social norms. In the present context, this means that subjects adapt to assumed group behavior and norms as expressed in Decision 2 when making Decision 1. If this were the case, the effect should be smaller for the payoff relevant items because we provide clear monetary incentives for revealing subjects' true preferences.

Each cell in Table 1 contains two items. The numbers in brackets correspond to the order in which the items were presented to the subjects. The payoffs to the subjects depended primarily on the number of exact hits in Decision 2 in all rounds. They were also influenced by the payoff relevant Decisions 1. Thus we provided clear monetary incentives for the true revelation of both the true estimates of other subjects' decisions and of the own preferences regarding Decision 1.

The protocol of the experiment as well as a translated version of the instructions can be found in appendices A and B.

### 3 Experimental Results

Altogether we conducted six sessions, each with 16 participants. The data from the ...rst session (pilot session) are not included in the analysis, since we slightly changed the setup and some items. Hence, we have data on 80 subjects from ...ve independent observations. Participants were mainly economics and business administration students at Humboldt-Universität. Each session took roughly one hour. The average payoff<sup>3</sup> was about DM 21.12.

#### 3.1 Analysis of Items with Information

The main results for the items with information are summarized in Tables 2, 3 and 4. Table 2 deals with the presence of a consensus effect. Here, options in Decision 1 of each round are labeled with A and B for simplicity. The option that appeared on the left side of the screen is labeled option A, that

---

<sup>3</sup>Participants could choose to get their payoff in stamps. If they did, we counted the cash equivalent of the stamps, which was DM 1.10.

Info Set	4A-0B		3A-1B		2A-2B		1A-3B		0A-4B	
Decision	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Item	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
	;	;	;	;	;	;	;	;	;	;
	C/N		C/N		C/N		C/N		C/N	
Fruit	0	3	4	6	14	13	6	9	3	22
	-	8.7	7.5	4.8	5.7	4.8	3.8	3.2	3.7	1.7
	-		C		C		C		C	
Free-Riding	2	1	10	6	7	15	9	18	6	6
	10.5	9	6.5	7.2	6.6	4.6	3.9	3.7	2.7	2.7
	C		N		C		C		N	
Rich-Poor	0	0	2	8	6	10	9	20	7	18
	-	-	7.5	5.4	5.8	3.8	4	1.9	2.9	0.4
	-		C		C		C		C	
Lottery	0	0	0	1	0	6	5	28	7	33
	-	-	-	6	-	3.8	3.8	2.0	2.3	0.8
	-		-		-		C		C	
Time Preference	1	0	3	4	8	12	13	23	3	13
	10	-	9	6.5	6.6	4.8	3.6	3.1	3.3	0.6
	-		C		C		C		C	
Months	1	3	5	7	3	14	16	16	5	10
	10	7	8.2	5.7	6	4.7	3.3	2.9	1.4	1.6
	C		C		C		C		N	
Donation Chapel	1	0	1	8	10	18	14	19	4	5
	11	-	8	5.8	5	4.6	3.7	3.0	3.5	0.2
	-		C		C		C		C	
Waiter	2	0	2	4	11	10	11	26	3	11
	10	-	9	5.5	5.5	4.3	3.4	1.9	1.7	0.5
	-		C		C		C		C	

# Number of subjects choosing A (left) or B (right) for the item in the corresponding row and receiving the information in the corresponding column

; Average estimate given by these subjects of how many of eleven subjects chose A for the corresponding item

C Difference of estimates directly above corresponds to a consensus effect

N Difference of estimates directly above does not correspond to a consensus effect

Table 2: Test for consensus effect (own decision not considered as information)



on the right side is labeled option B.<sup>4</sup> In the rest of this section we will refer to the subjects who chose option A in Decision 1 as 'A-subjects' and the subjects who chose option B in Decision 1 as 'B-subjects'.

As in most "classical" studies of the false consensus effect, in Table 2 we simply compare the estimations of how many of eleven subjects chose option A given by the A-subjects with those given by the B-subjects. We consider a consensus effect present if the first estimate is higher than the second, because this means that at least one of the groups estimates that the consensus for the own decision is greater than is justified by the information given. Since the information provided clearly matters (as will be explained below), it is only reasonable to apply this comparison to each set of subjects who received the same information separately.

The rows in Table 2 refer to the different items while the columns refer to the different information sets that the subjects were provided with before Decision 2. Each cell contains three entries. These are the number of A-subjects (upper left) and B-subjects (upper right) who received the corresponding information set (aggregated over all three sessions), the average estimate of how many of eleven other subjects chose option A given by the A-subjects (middle left) and by the B-subjects (middle right) and an indicator (bottom line) which is C if a consensus effect is present and N otherwise. Consider for example the item "Free-Riding" and the information set "1A-3B". The entries in this cell show that 9 A-subjects and 18 B-subjects received the information "one other subject chose A and three subjects chose B" and that their average estimates were 3.9 and 3.7, respectively. Thus a consensus effect is present which is indicated by the C in the bottom line.

### 3.1.1 The Effect of the Information

Examining Table 2, the first important thing we see is a clear effect of the information given. The less A's the subjects have in their information sets, the lower their estimates of the number of subjects who chose option A. To see this, consider any item and either the A-subjects or the B-subjects, for example the item "Waiter" and the A-subjects. Those subjects who had four A's in their information set on average estimated that 10 out of 11 subjects chose option A. The estimates strictly decrease with the number of A's in the information set to 9, 5.5, 3.4, and eventually to 1.7 for the information set containing no A's. This strict decrease in A estimates is violated only twice. For the item "Fruit", the B-subjects on average estimated 4.8 choices of option A both if they had two or three A's in their information set. For the

---

<sup>4</sup>To subjects, options always were named by an abbreviation of the respective meaning (see Appendix C), not by these labels.

item "Free-Riding", estimates increase from 6.5 by the A-subjects who had three A's in their information set to 6.6 by those who received just two. All other comparisons between two cells are in the direction suggested. Hence the information given to subjects clearly affects their estimates as expected.

The observations within each session are not independent and thus it is not possible to apply straightforward tests to the aggregate data. An alternative method is to treat each session as an independent observation and consider each item separately. Any comparison between two information conditions which shows a higher number of A estimates for the subjects with more A's in their information set than for those with fewer A's (and the same own decision) contradicts the hypothesis that information has no influence. Hence we simply count the results of all these comparisons and consider one session to be a hit for this item if the number of positive differences is larger than the number of negative differences. This occurs under the hypothesis that information has no influence with probability of less than  $\frac{1}{2}$  (since there is a positive probability for a draw). Therefore the probability for a hit in all 32 sessions is smaller than  $\frac{1}{32} = 3.125\%$  and hence in this case the hypothesis can be rejected for the item at the 5%-level. Using this procedure we found a significant effect of the information for six of the eight items (data not reported). For the remaining two items ("Fruit" and "Time Preference") there are four hits and the effect of the information is thus in the same direction but not significant. Thus the overall effect of information on the estimates of other subjects' behavior is well established.

### 3.1.2 The Consensus Effect

The second important observation that can be drawn from Table 2 is the presence of a consensus effect. Of 32 cells where a comparison between the estimates given by the A-subjects and the B-subjects could be made, 29 show an effect as predicted by the consensus hypothesis. Of the three remaining cells, there are one draw (item "Free-Riding", information set "0A-4B") and two differences in the opposite direction, one small (item "Months", information set "0A-4B") and one somewhat substantial (item "Free-Riding", information set "3A-1B"). So there is a very clear indication of a consensus effect in the present study.

As noted above, for strict statistical tests we have to treat the sessions as independent observations instead of the decisions. For any item, any session, and any information condition, we compare the estimates given by the A-subjects with those given by the B-subjects. We count a session as a hit for this item if for more information conditions the difference between average estimates given by A-subjects and by B-subjects is positive rather

than negative. Under the hypothesis that the own decision is irrelevant to the estimate, i.e. the absence of a consensus effect, the probability for a hit is less than  $\frac{1}{2}$  (since the probability for a draw is positive). Corresponding to the analysis of the effect of information, there is a significant consensus effect at the 5%-level for an item if there is a hit in all five sessions. Using this procedure we found a significant consensus effect for two items ("Fruits" and "Waiter"). Of the remaining items four have four hits, one three hits and two draws and one two hits, two draws and one miss (data not reported). If the probability for a draw is taken into account there is a significant consensus effect (5%-level) for two further items ("Rich-Poor" and "Lottery"). Thus the evidence for the consensus effect is rather strong, given that several draws and misses are caused by cells with only one subject so that the variance across cells is very high.

Although we are aware of the fact that we cannot legitimately treat the different items in one session as independent, it is illustrative to ignore this problem. If we considered each item in each session as independent observation and defined hits as above, we would obtain 31 out of possible 40 (eight items times five sessions) hits. This would allow the hypothesis that there is no consensus effect to be rejected at a 0.5%-level. Since the possible influence of the dependence of the items is not clear, we consider this as at least a clear indication of the presence of a consensus effect although it is not hard evidence by strict standards.

The two conclusions drawn from Table 2 show that the estimates subjects give for the choices of other subjects are clearly influenced by both the information they receive and their own choice in Decision 1.

### 3.1.3 The False Consensus Effect

As was argued in the introduction, to examine the false consensus effect it must be acknowledged that it is rational to use the information concerning the own decision in the same way as the information about the decision of any randomly selected subject from the same population. Hence, in the present study subjects have the information about five subjects and not just four. Thus to decide whether there is a false consensus effect we have to compare those subjects who made different choices in Decision 1 but received the same information including that about their own decision. An A-subject who received the information set "2A-2B" should expect more A choices than a B-subject who received the same information. Therefore, a comparison should not be made between these two subjects. Instead, the first should be compared to the B-subjects who received the information set "3A-1B" since both have the total information that three subjects chose A and two

Info Set	4A-1B		3A-2B		2A-3B		1A-4B	
Decision	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Item	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
	;	;	;	;	;	;	;	;
	F/N		F/N		F/N		F/N	
Fruit	4	3	14	6	6	13	3	9
	7.5	8.7	5.7	4.8	3.8	4.8	3.7	3.2
	N		F		N		F	
Free-Riding	10	1	7	6	9	15	6	18
	6.5	9	6.6	7.2	3.9	4.6	2.7	3.7
	N		N		N		N	
Rich-Poor	2	0	6	8	9	10	7	20
	7.5	-	5.8	5.4	4	3.8	2.9	1.9
	-		F		F		F	
Lottery	0	0	0	1	5	6	7	28
	-	-	-	6	3.8	3.8	2.3	2.0
	-		-		N		F	
Time Preference	3	0	8	4	13	12	3	23
	9	-	6.6	6.5	3.6	4.8	3.3	3.1
	-		F		N		F	
Months	5	3	3	7	16	14	5	16
	8.2	7	6	5.7	3.3	4.7	1.4	2.9
	F		F		N		N	
Donation Chapel	1	0	10	8	14	18	4	19
	8	-	5	5.8	3.7	4.6	3.5	3.0
	-		N		N		F	
Waiter	2	0	11	4	11	10	3	26
	9	-	5.5	5.5	3.4	4.3	1.7	1.9
	-		N		N		N	

- # Number of subjects choosing A (left) or B (right) for the item in the corresponding row and receiving the information in the corresponding column (including their own decision)
- ; Average estimate given by these subjects of how many of eleven subjects chose A for the corresponding item
- C Difference of estimates directly above corresponds to a false consensus effect
- N Difference of estimates directly above does not correspond to a false consensus effect

Table 3: Test for (truly) false consensus effect (own decision considered as information)

chose B ("3A-2B"). The second should be compared to those A-subjects who received the information set "1A-3B" since both have the total information set "2A-3B". Only if in these comparisons the A-subjects estimate a higher number of A choices than the B-subjects, would there be an indication for the presence of a false consensus effect because this would imply that greater weight was assigned to the own decision than to that of the subjects about whom information was given.

Table 3 is structured similarly to Table 2, it only has to be noted that the own decision is included in the information set. For example, in the column marked "3A-2B" we note for each item the number and average estimate of A-subjects who received the information set "2A-2B" (upper and middle left) and the number and average estimate of B-subjects who received the information set "3A-1B" (upper and middle right). If, among the subjects with the same total information, the A-subjects on average estimated more A choices than the B-subjects, we note an "F" for "false consensus present" in the bottom line of the cell, otherwise an "N" for "no false consensus present".

A brief inspection of Table 3 reveals that the situation is far less clear than that in Table 2. From 26 cells which allow a comparison, only eleven show a difference between average estimates in line with the false consensus hypothesis, whereas 13 show a difference in the opposite direction and two show no difference. Furthermore, among the eleven cells with a difference corresponding to a false consensus, there are six for which the difference is small (i.e.  $< 0.5$ ) and six which are based on a very small sample (i.e. less than ...ve subjects for at least one group), including three cells with both these defects. This leaves just two cells which show a substantial difference between average estimates corresponding to a false consensus and are based on a larger sample ("Fruits, 3A-2B" and "Rich-Poor, 1A-4B").<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, there are ten cells which show a difference larger than 0.5 in the direction opposite to that of a false consensus and are based on at least ...ve subjects per group ("Fruit, 2A-3B", "Free-Riding, 3A-2B, 2A-3B, 1A-4B", "Time Preference, 2A-3B", "Months, 2A-3B, 1A-4B", "Donation Chapel, 3A-2B, 2A-3B", "Waiter, 2A-3B").

A separate analysis of the single items reveals that only for the item "Rich-Poor" the results from all information sets taken together are more in favor of a false consensus effect than the opposite. The possible conclusion that a false consensus effect might be more likely in the respective category ("morally relevant" and "payoff relevant") is not sustained, since the other

---

<sup>5</sup>This result does not in principle depend on the specification of a small difference and a small sample. For example, only four cells fulfill the weaker requirement of a difference of at least 0.4 and a minimal number of 4 A- and B-subjects.

item from the same category ("Donation Chapel") shows differences which are clearly contrary to this conclusion. Also, if this conclusion were true, the items from the category "morally relevant" and "not payoff relevant" ("Free-Riding" and "Waiter") should exhibit a false consensus at least as strongly. But they clearly do not, indeed, just the contrary.

Altogether there is stronger indication of an effect opposite to a false consensus effect, i.e. that subjects weight the information about their own decision less than they do the information they have been given about other subjects' decisions.

This conclusion is confirmed by an analysis of the single items for each separate session. As with the consensus effect, we count a session as a hit if for more information conditions the difference between average estimates given by A-subjects and B-subjects is positive rather than negative. For none of the items are there more than two (out of possible three) hits. But there is also no significant effect in the other direction. Altogether, there are eleven hits, eleven draws and 18 misses. Hence this analysis to some degree supports the conclusion of an effect opposite to a false consensus.

### 3.1.4 Regression Analysis

The tendency against a false consensus effect is shown more clearly by a regression analysis. Assume the simple linear regression model

$$E = \beta_0 + \beta_1 I + \epsilon;$$

where  $E$  = # of A's estimated,  $I$  = # of A's in the information set and  $O$  = # of A's in the own decision, i.e.  $O = 1$  if the own decision is A and  $O = 0$  otherwise. If subjects weight their own decision like they do the information about other subjects' decisions, then  $\beta_0$  equals  $\beta_1$ . A false consensus effect corresponds to  $\beta_0 > \beta_1$  and the underweighting of the own decision to  $\beta_0 < \beta_1$ : The estimated coefficients are shown in table 4.

The first column contains the coefficients for the regression over all sessions, the first row those over all items. Over all sessions and all items,  $\beta_0$  is clearly smaller than  $\beta_1$  and hence the own decision is weighted less than information about other subjects. The same holds for any single session over all items. If the own decision were weighted more than, or equal to, the information about other subjects' decisions, the probability that  $\beta_0 < \beta_1$  for a single session would be smaller than  $\frac{1}{2}$ : Since the sessions are independent, the probability that  $\beta_0 < \beta_1$  for all three sessions is smaller than  $\frac{1}{32} < .05$ . Consequently, the hypothesis that subjects overweight their own decision relative to other subjects' decisions (or that they weight it equally) can be rejected at

session	all	2	3	4	5	6
coefficients	°	°	°	°	°	°
items						
all	1.33 1.73	1.44 1.72	1.51 1.78	0.85 1.74	1.35 1.47	1.42 1.83
morally relevant	1.39 1.75	0.36 2.06	1.77 1.87	1.29 1.64	2.00 1.39	1.19 1.66
not morally rel.	1.28 1.73	2.32 1.49	1.36 1.85	0.43 1.84	0.54 1.56	1.57 1.95
payoff relevant	1.66 1.78	1.15 1.69	1.97 1.56	1.13 2.13	1.62 1.41	2.25 1.90
not payoff rel.	1.01 1.67	1.64 1.58	1.00 1.91	0.37 1.28	1.16 1.52	0.56 1.75

Table 4: regression coefficients (°: own decision, °: information), session 1 (pilot) is not reported.

a 5%- level. Hence we obtain a significant effect opposite to a false consensus effect.

The comparison of the morally relevant to the morally irrelevant items allows us to test whether a potential false consensus effect has an ego-defensive function. Over all sessions there is a tendency in the direction corresponding to this hypothesis, namely the relative weight given to the own decision compared to the information is slightly higher for the morally relevant items than for the morally irrelevant items. However, we do not consider this to indicate that this hypothesis is correct because the weight given to the own decision is still smaller than that given to the information. The fact that the effect contrary to a false consensus is smaller cannot be considered an indication that the (non-existing) false consensus effect is larger for these items.

The comparison between payoff relevant and not payoff relevant items allows us to test the hypothesis that a possible false consensus effect is not based on the influence of the own decision on the estimation of others' decisions, but rather on an adaptation of the own decision towards the estimated majority. If this were the case, then the effect should be smaller for the payoff relevant items since the incentives for expressing the true preferences work in the opposite direction. Hence the relative weight of the own decision should be smaller for the payoff relevant decisions. We found just the opposite. We only have a speculative explanation for this result. These items are further from everyday experience than the not payoff relevant items. This could re-

sult in a reasoning process which is based less on general expectations and the given information and more on introspection.

Following our general argument that incentives matter, it may be argued that the analysis should be restricted to the payoff relevant items. Then, over all sessions, the weight of the own decision is still smaller than that of the given information. However, for the sessions considered separately the picture is less clear. For three sessions (3,5 and 6), the weight of the own decision is slightly larger than that of the given information, for two (2 and 4) it is smaller. Hence we have no significant effect contrary to a false consensus effect in this case, but also no hint in line with the false consensus effect.

On the other hand, it can be argued that the items that are not payoff relevant can be included in the analysis since the subjects do not have to estimate what other subjects do but what they state in the experiment. Hence, if subjects do not answer according to their real preferences, they should also take into account the fact that other subjects might do the same. Consequently, the task is essentially the same except that, apart from the possible projection of own preferences, the possible projection of own honesty also matters. Our interest is not primarily in the real preferences of the subjects but in their beliefs about what others state in the same situation. We consider this a valid argument for the inclusion of the not payoff relevant items in the analysis.

For all sessions the own decision clearly matters ( $\beta > 0$ ) and hence the regression supports the existence of a consensus effect in our experiment. This effect is more clearly established than the underweighting of the own decision. Subjects more consistently weight their own decision positively than that they underweight it.

## 3.2 Analysis of Items without Information

The average estimates given for the items where we did not provide any information about other subjects' Decision 1 can be found in Table 5. The columns show from left to right a key to the content of the item for Decision 1, the number of A-subjects, their average estimate of A choices, the number of B-subjects, their average estimate of A choices and the difference between the average estimate of A choices given by the A-subjects and by the B-subjects.

### 3.2.1 The Consensus Effect

For all items, the average estimate of A choices is higher for the A-subjects than for the B-subjects. Thus there is a consensus effect at the aggregate level. The same holds for ...ve items ("Public Good", "Tax Evasion", "Dona-



item	A #	A ;	B #	B ;	A ; - B ;
Payo $\alpha$ System	48	6.8	32	5	1.8
Public Good	58	8.5	22	3.7	4.8
Tax Evasion	42	7.2	38	4.4	2.8
Writing	29	5.7	51	4.2	1.5
Donation ai	41	7.6	39	3.8	3.8
Elevator	57	7.3	23	4.9	2.4
Exam	50	8.1	30	4.4	3.7
Stamps	57	9.1	23	6	3.1

Table 5: Test for consensus effect (own decision not considered as information)

tion ai", "Exam", "Stamps") for each of the ...ve sessions. Hence, by using a binomial test as in the preceding sections, the hypothesis that the estimates are not biased towards the own choice can be rejected at the 5%-level. For the remaining three items, average estimates given by the A-subjects are higher in four out of ...ve sessions and hence also clearly in line with a consensus effect, though not significantly. Thus we replicate the results of conventional research on the false consensus effect. To a large extent subjects use the own decision as guideline when estimating other subjects' choices.

### 3.2.2 The False Consensus Effect

Concerning the falsity of the consensus effect when no information is given, our results are difficult to interpret. The definition we gave above for the (truly) false consensus effect requires that the weight assigned to the own decision can be compared to the weight given to any other subject's decision. Hence, in the absence of information concerning other subjects' decisions, the falsity of a present consensus effect cannot be decided.

An alternative way is to compare the given estimates to those that would be optimal estimates based on Bayesian updating of a reasonable prior belief. Since it is difficult to justify a particular prior belief, usually a uniform prior belief is chosen (see Dawes, 1989). Then a false consensus would be considered present if more consensus is estimated than would result from this procedure. Bayesian updating of a uniform prior belief using a sample of size one results in a posterior belief with an expected value of  $\frac{2}{3}$  for the own decision (see Dawes 1989). For a group of eleven, this means that the expected value of A choices of the posterior belief is  $\frac{2}{3} \cdot 11 = 7.33$  for an own choice of A and  $\frac{1}{3} \cdot 11 = 3.67$  for an own choice of B. Since subjects had to give integer estimates, 7 or 4 would have been as close as possible to the expected

values and hence a false consensus could be considered present if A-subjects on average expect more than 7 A choices and B-subjects on average expect less than 4 A choices. According to this criterion, there would have been a false consensus effect for two of the eight items.

However, the assumption of a uniform prior belief (as that of any particular prior belief) is of course completely arbitrary. On the other hand the assumption of a unimodal prior belief with probabilities decreasing in the distance to the mode is justified since anything else would not appear to be a very reasonable form of belief (for example it does not seem plausible to believe that both four and six A choices are more probable than ...ve). Such a prior belief would have a smaller variance than a uniform prior belief and therefore the expected value would be more robust to updating. Hence Bayesian updating of such a prior belief would result in a lower difference between expected values of the posterior beliefs of A-subjects and B-subjects. Thus, if we relax the assumption of a uniform prior belief and instead assume a unimodal prior belief, a false consensus effect could be considered present if the observed difference is larger than  $\frac{1}{3} \cdot 11 = 3.67$ : Three items would fulfill this criterion, two of them just marginally.

Several problems remain with this approach. First of all, it is not necessarily a sign of overweighting of the own decision if too extreme updating is observed. It could simply be that subjects give too much weight to any information about a single choice and this would thus simply indicate an inability to carry out Bayesian updating.<sup>6</sup> Second, there is no reason to give the expected value as estimate, at least with our incentive system. To maximize the expected payoff, subjects have to maximize the probability of an exact hit and should hence give the mode of the posterior belief as the

---

<sup>6</sup>In awareness of this possibility Alicke and Largo (1995) designed an experiment to compare the weight of the own decision with information about other subjects. Their design is similar to ours in that they also provide information about four other subjects. Thus we agree with them that a false consensus effect can only be investigated in the presence of information about other subjects.

Alicke and Largo found a (truly) false consensus effect, but, in contrast to our study, their items were performance tests. Conceptionally, this is very different, since the background information concerning performance tests in a familiar area (psychology students had to take a test in personality assessment) is much broader than that of preferences regarding unfamiliar choices. Usually subjects have some reasonable belief about their relative performance and thus information about their success is much more informative than information about the success of a randomly chosen subject. Hence, in this context, it can be perfectly rational to assign greater weight to the own success or failure than to that of another subject.

Alicke and Largo also have to be criticized because their subjects have systematically been deceived and because no incentives for the true revelation of estimates have been provided.

estimate. Under the assumption of a uniform prior belief the mode of the posterior belief is either all A or no A, depending on the own decision. Hence, under these conditions, no overweighting would be possible. And even if an incentive scheme is chosen so that it is optimal to choose the expected value of the posterior belief as an estimate, it will probably not be simple enough to be easily understood by subjects.

If we use the approach to compare estimates with the result of Bayesian updating of a uniform prior belief to individual data, we observe more overweighting (316 choices) than underweighting (219 choices) or perfect updating (105 choices). This could be interpreted as an indication for the presence of a false consensus effect but all the above criticism applies.

The fact that the four items from the category "morally relevant" are among those ...ve items with the strongest consensus effect might be considered as support for the hypothesis that a possible false consensus effect has an ego-defensive function. However, this effect is very small for the items from the same category for which we provided information. The consensus effect for the items which are payoff-relevant is on average stronger than that of those which are not. This contradicts the hypothesis that the consensus effect is, in fact, an adaptation effect which would imply that it would decrease if incentives for the true revelation of preferences are provided. The results for the items with information are along the same line in this respect.

### 3.3 Additional Results

Two interesting results turned up as side-effects. First, there were surprisingly large contributions to the public good (58 out of 80 subjects contributed), given that this was a one-shot game (although it cannot be excluded that subjects might have expected similar items to follow and thus did not perceive this decision as a one-shot game). Second, the two items "Donation Chapel" and "Donation ai", which were conceptually very similar and thus the respective Decisions 1 were expected to be positively correlated, were indeed slightly negatively correlated (correlation coefficient  $\hat{\rho} = -0.032$ ).

There is no notable gender difference with respect to either the consensus or false consensus effects. Although the tendency to underweight the own decision is stronger for economics and business students than for the other subjects, this does not allow any conclusion to be made since the data basis for the other subjects was too small. For these subjects, too, there is on average no false consensus, i.e. no overweighting of the own decision, just less underweighting.

### 3.4 Questionnaires

Although we are careful in interpreting the results of the questionnaires from a general perspective since no incentives are provided for revealing the true beliefs, we still believe that they provide interesting insights into the cognitive processes which caused the results we observed.

The most interesting statements were given by two subjects stating explicitly that they had information not just about four subjects' decisions but about ...ve, including themselves, and that they based their estimates on this information. Whereas some subjects decided to discard the information given since they did not consider it as representative, the majority of descriptions of the decision process is well in line with the results we observed. Most subjects stated that, based on the information given, they formed their choice by calculating the corresponding numbers for eleven subjects and then adapting, using either their own choice or general expectations, or both. This process of using their own decision simply as information to adapt the estimates formed on the basis of the information given may have led to an underweighting of the own decision. Subjects obviously tried to be rational but most of them were uncertain about how to weight the own decision, although they were aware that they should consider it somehow. Concerning the rounds without information, the majority of subjects stated that they based their expectations on their own decision, which is clearly in line with the observed consensus effect for this condition.

A surprising result was that subjects on average dramatically overestimated their hit rate. The average estimated hit rate was 28:9%, whereas the average actual hit rate was 11:56%. This is only slightly above the expected hit rate of pure guessing which would have been  $\frac{1}{12}$   $\frac{1}{4}$  8:33%; a remarkable result on its own (but with the positive consequence for the experimenters of keeping costs much lower than expected). Even more remarkable is the fact that, although the subjects used the provided information in a reasonable way, the actual hit rate for the items without information was slightly better than for the items with information (77 vs. 71 out of 640 possible hits).

## 4 Concluding Remarks

Our study was designed to provide an easy test for a (truly) false consensus effect and to overcome the shortcomings of previous studies by providing clear monetary incentives for the revelation of true beliefs.

It indicates that, given both these incentives and representative information, although subjects show a consensus effect, they show no false consensus

effect. They significantly underweight, not overweight, their own decision compared to the representative information we provided. This primary result has qualitatively been replicated by A. Ortmann and R. Hertwig who used an adaptation of our design in an experiment at Bowdoin College in December 1998.

Thus the false consensus effect might not be very relevant for economic applications. Plainly, it could even be a result of bad definition. However, this conclusion might be premature. It might hold for the type of information we provide, namely explicit information without uncertainty. We do not know what the results would be like if the information were implicit, for example if subjects observed the behavior of other subjects in repeated games, but did not receive a list of others' decisions. In this case, it might happen that subjects overweight their own decisions because of problems in keeping track of others' behavior. This situation may be more relevant to economics since, in reality, people often have the opportunity to observe other people's behavior but do not receive a list of what they did. Certainly this is an area for future research.

Oberman et al. (1996) provided such implicit information and did not find a false consensus effect. They conducted a public good experiment and did not find any systematic difference between players and spectators for whom the own decision of the player becomes just another piece of information. Hence, the own decision is not weighted more than the information about other subjects. Oberman et al. did not even find a consensus effect in the sense that cooperators and individualists did not differ in their estimates of cooperation rates. However, this result has to be treated with care, since they did not control for the information the subjects received. Given their finite subject set in each session, cooperators on average met fewer cooperators than individualists did. Hence the equality of the estimates of cooperation rates means that, if subjects used the information at all, they also gave some weight to their own decisions. So there is a consensus effect. But again, this is not a false consensus effect since, including themselves, cooperators on average met more cooperators than individualists did (since they met themselves for sure but only a subgroup of the other subjects in their session). So even if they gave the same weight to their own decision as to that of other subjects, they should have estimated a higher cooperation rate. The results of Oberman et al. are in line with ours in the sense that there is a consensus effect, but subjects underweight rather than overweight their own choice. What is somewhat surprising in this context is that in our experiment a public good game had the strongest consensus effect among the items for which we did not provide any information.

Concerning the rounds where we did not provide any information, there

are several possible criteria to decide whether the consensus effect we found is a false consensus effect. However, we believe that the best conclusion we can draw is that the criticism that can be applied to any one of these criteria is much more convincing than the possible conclusions which it allows. Unless someone comes up with an ingenious idea about how to measure prior beliefs, examining the false consensus effect in the absence of other information does not seem to be a very promising idea. As noted in the introduction, we believe that it does not even make much sense to define a false consensus effect without reference to other information.

## References

- [1] Abbink, K. and Sadrieh, A., 1995. "RatImage - Research Assistance Toolbox for Computer-Aided Human Behavior Experiments"; University of Bonn, Discussion Paper No. B-325.
- [2] Alicke, M. D. and Largo, E., 1995. "The Role of the Self in the False Consensus Effect"; *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 31, 28-47.
- [3] Camerer, C. 1996. "Rules for Experimenting in Psychology and Economics, and Why They Differ"; in: W. Albers et al. (Eds.): *Understanding Strategic Interaction – Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten*, Heidelberg: Springer.
- [4] Dawes, R. M., 1989. "Statistical Criteria for Establishing a Truly False Consensus Effect"; *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 25, 1-17.
- [5] Dawes, R. M., 1990. "The Potential Nonfalsity of the False Consensus Effect"; in: R. M. Hogarth (Ed.), *Insights in Decision Making: A Tribute to Hillel J. Einhorn*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- [6] Engelmann, Dirk, 1998. "Survival of Trustworthiness as a Consequence of a False Consensus Effect"; mimeo, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
- [7] Jacobsen, E. and Sadrieh, A., 1996. "Experimental Proof for the Motivational Importance of Reciprocity"; University of Bonn, Discussion Paper No. B-386.
- [8] Krueger, J. and Clement, R. W., 1994. "The Truly False Consensus Effect: An Ineradicable and Egocentric Bias in Social Perception"; *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 67, 596-610.

- [9] Mullen, B., Atkins, J. L., Champion, D. S., Edwards, C., Hardy, D. Story, J. E., and Venderklok, M., 1985. "The False Consensus Effect: A Meta-Analysis of 115 Hypothesis Tests"; *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 21, 263-83.
- [10] Omerman, T., Sonnemans, J., and Schram, A., 1996. "Value Orientations, Expectations and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods"; *The Economic Journal* 106, 817-45.
- [11] Ross, L., Greene, D., and House, P., 1977. "The 'False Consensus Effect': An Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and Attribution Processes"; *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 13, 279-301.
- [12] Selten, R. and Ockenfels, A., 1998. "An Experimental Solidarity Game"; *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 34, 517-39.
- [13] Sherman, S. J., Presson, C. C., and Chassin, L., 1984. "Mechanisms Underlying the False Consensus Effect: The Special Role of Threats to the Self"; *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 10, 127-38.

## A Experimental Protocol


The experiment was conducted at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Subjects were invited to register for an experiment through posters and announcements in classes. When subjects came to the computer pool arranged they were randomly placed at separated, isolated computer terminals. They received written instructions (see Appendix B) for which they could ask for clarification. They then played the sequence of Decide, Receive information, and Estimate for 16 different items (see Appendix C) without any feedback about their hit rate. After this they had to fill in a questionnaire before getting feedback about their hit rate and payoff. Finally, they were paid according to their number of hits and their decisions about donations, form and time of payoff.

## B Translated Instructions

Welcome to our experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have any difficulty in understanding, do not ask for help out loud, just raise your hand. We will then answer your questions privately. Please stop communicating with other participants from now on.

You will get a showup fee of DM 10.- for your participation. You can gain or lose additional money during the experiment. You will end up with a positive amount in any case.

The experiment consists of 16 rounds. In each of these rounds you have to make two decisions. First you have to choose between two alternatives (Decision 1). Simply click the relevant button to make your choice.



Next your task is to estimate how eleven other subjects decided in Decision 1 (Decision 2). Those eleven subjects are randomly picked from the participants, independently for every participant and round. You will not know who these people are. Please choose a distribution by clicking the relevant field. The upper number in each field means the number of subjects who have chosen alternative A. The lower number means the number of subjects who have chosen Alternative B.



Estimation												
Please estimate how many of 11 randomly picked participants decided for <Alternative A> respectively <Alternative B>!												
<Alternative A>	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
<Alternative B>	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

For example, if you expect that two out of eleven subjects have chosen hAlternative Ai and nine have chosen hAlternative Bi then click the ...eld:

2
9

In some rounds you will receive some information before making Decision 2. You will be informed about how four other participants decided in Decision 1. (You do not have to estimate Decision 1 for any of them.)


Information
4 randomly picked participants made the following decisions: <Alternative B>; <Alternative A>; <Alternative B>; <Alternative B>.

These four subjects will also be randomly picked independently for every participant and round. Your own decision will not be included. You will not know about whom you received information. Other participants might receive information about your decision but in this case they will not know you were the decision maker.

Your actual payoff will be determined as follows: The number of correct estimates in Decision 2 determines your raw payoff. It consists of DM 10.- showup fee and DM 4.- for every correct estimate (hit). You will not receive any information about your hit rate or your current raw payoff during the experiment.

Some of the Decisions 1 have an effect on the size and form of your raw payoff. There are some transfer decisions which govern how your raw payoff is converted into your actual payoff. As well, there are some decisions which govern the form of your payment. Hence, your payoff results according to the following scheme. This may look complicated at first, but it will become clear during the experiment.

## Estimates and Decisions



Please keep the sheet with your subject-id. Without it you won't receive any payment.

### C Items

Fruit: What do you eat more frequently, Oranges or Bananas?

Oranges

Bananas

Free-riding: Do you occasionally free-ride on public transport?

No

Yes

Payo<sup>α</sup> System: You can change the payo<sup>α</sup> system (up to now DM 10.- showup fee and DM 4.- per hit) and receive DM 5.- showup fee and DM 6.- per hit. Do you want to change?

Keep current system

Change

Public Good: You can invest DM 1.- of your payo<sup>α</sup> in a shared fund. For each DM invested every participant will receive DM 0.25.

I invest DM 1.-

I do not invest

Tax Evasion: Suppose you have a new washing machine delivered. The delivery man offers not to bill you for the sales tax if you go without a receipt. Do you accept this offer of tax evasion?

I accept

I do not accept

Rich-Poor: If you are the one with the highest raw payoff, will you give away DM 2.- to the one with the lowest raw payoff?

I give away DM 2.-

I do not give away anything

Lottery: You can take part in a lottery. Your payoff is then no longer determined by the hits in all rounds but we will randomly draw one round which is paid out 16 times. The showup fee remains the same.

I take part in the lottery

I do not take part

Writing: What do you use more frequently, pencil or pen?

Pencil

Pen

Donation ai: You can donate DM 1.- of your raw payoff to amnesty international. For every DM donated the experimenters will donate an additional DM 1.-. This donation will be deducted from your raw payoff.

I do not donate

I donate DM 1.-

Time Preference: You can receive your payoff immediately after the experiment or you can get your payoff plus 10% interest after one month. Do you want your payoff now or later?

Now

Later

Elevator: If there is an elevator, do you use it for going to the third floor or do you take the stairs?

Stairs

Elevator

Exam: Do you allow neighbors who are unknown to you to copy from you in exams?

No

Yes

Months: Which month do you prefer for holidays, March or October?

October

March

Stamps: You can receive your payoff either in cash or in stamps. If you choose stamps you receive one stamp worth DM 1.10 for every DM of your payoff. We round up to entire stamps. What do you prefer?

Cash

Stamps

Donation Chapel: You can donate DM 1.- of your raw payoff to the reconstruction of the Heiliggeist Chapel. For every DM donated the experimenters will donate an additional DM 1.-. This donation will be

deducted from your raw payo<sup>α</sup>.

I donate DM 1.-

I do not donate

Waiter: Do you usually correct the waiter in a restaurant who has miscalculated a bill in your favor?

Yes

No