Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46946 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1996
Quellenangabe: 
[Publisher:] Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) [Place:] Kiel [Year:] 1996
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Kiel Working Paper No. 760
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
Markov perfection has become the usual solution concept to determine the non-cooperative equilibrium in a dynamic game. However, Markov perfection is a stronger solution concept than subgame perfection: Markov perfection rules out any cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma game because the history of previous cooperation does neither change the future action space nor the possible payoffs in this setting. This paper demonstrates that a dynamic modelling approach may sustain cooperation by Markov perfect strategies in situations which are usually modelled as repeated prisoners' dilemma games. The idea is that past defection from cooperation changes a compliance state variable which enters the utility function. The corresponding dynamic games are discussed for the trigger strategy and for a strategy which is weakly renegotiation-proof. Finally, the paper shows that dynamic game modelling improves the chances for strong renegotiation-proofness in the corresponding repeated game.
Schlagwörter: 
Repeated games
dynamic games
Markov perfection
Folk Theorem
JEL: 
C70
C72
C73
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Dokumentversion: 
Digitized Version

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
649.24 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.