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Markov perfection and cooperation in repeated games

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MARKOV PERFECTION AND COOPERATION IN REPEATED GAMES

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Abstract. Markov perfection has become the usual solution concept to determine the non-cooperative equilibrium in a dynamic game. However, Markov perfection is a stronger solution concept than subgame perfection: Markov perfection rules out any cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma game because the history of previous cooperation does neither change the future action space nor the possible payoffs in this setting. This paper demonstrates that a dynamic modelling approach may sustain cooperation by Markov perfect strategies in situations which are usually modelled as repeated prisoners' dilemma games. The idea is that past defection from cooperation changes a compliance state variable which enters the utility function. The corresponding dynamic games are discussed for the trigger strategy and for a strategy which is weakly renegotiation-proof. Finally, the paper shows that dynamic game modelling improves the chances for strong renegotiation-proofness in the corresponding repeated game.
Markov perfection and cooperation in repeated games

1. Introduction

When several players have to choose their actions simultaneously without being able to commit themselves to coordinated behavior, such non-cooperative behavior may imply significant welfare losses compared to Pareto-optimal behavior. Pareto-inferior results are guaranteed if the game is a game under almost perfect information, is only played once and is of the prisoners' dilemma type. However, repetition, i.e. playing at least twice, may change the behavior of agents as future responses to current actions are taken into account. Since the Folk Theorem, it is well-known that cooperation may emerge when the discount factor of all involved agents is high enough (see e.g. Abreu, 1988, Benoit, Krishna, 1985, Fudenberg, Maskin, 1986). The credibility of actions which respond to past behavior is guaranteed if the strategies involve no incredible or empty threats, i.e. when the equilibrium is subgame-perfect (Selten, 1965). A simple strategy is the trigger strategy in an infinitely repeated game under almost perfect information. It requires that every player starts with cooperation and reverts to non-cooperation forever after defection of the other player. If cooperation pays compared to defection and subsequent infinite non-cooperation, this strategy is credible because the non-cooperative equilibrium of the one-shot game is an equilibrium in the supergame as well.

Repetition is a very simple assumption with respect to the time structure of a game. In general, games involving a time structure can be dynamic such that the action space and the utilities are not stationary but change endogenously as a result of past actions. An example for the impact of past actions on the future action space is the common exploitation of a non-renewable resource: the first period's action space is limited by the available resource stock, whereas the nth period's action space is limited by the resource stock and the actions taken in all preceding (n-1) periods. An example of
changing utilities is the voluntary contribution to a public capital good: suppose that every period each player may either pay or not pay a certain contribution the sum of which defines the investment into public capital. If the utility of each player increases with the capital good, it is clear that each player's utility changes in the course of time.

From this perspective, repeated games are a real subset of the set of dynamic games because they make the specific assumption that neither the action space nor the utility functions change. Dutta (1995) has demonstrated that this distinction is significant because the Folk Theorem does not hold for dynamic games in general. The discussion of the appropriate solution concept for determining the non-cooperative equilibrium path of general dynamic games has led to Markov perfection. A strategy is Markov if two histories of the past game which imply an identical action space and identical payoffs in subsequent periods imply an identical strategy. A Markov perfect equilibrium is a subgame-perfect equilibrium the strategies of which are Markov. The idea is that the past should matter for strategy selection only insofar as it changes the action space and the utilities. If two different paths imply a state of the dynamic system which gives identical action spaces and identical payoffs at a certain moment, strategies chosen should not differ because both paths have obviously not led to no payoff-relevant differences in the future.

Determining the non-cooperative path of dynamic games by Markov perfection is due to three reasons (Maskin, Tirole, 1994): first, Markov perfection limits the set of possible equilibria. Second, Markov strategies are simple and make decisions easier compared to other strategies because they depend only on the current state of the dynamic system. Third, they capture the notion that payoff-irrelevant events in the past should have no influence on future behavior and that "minor causes should have minor effects" (Maskin, Tirole, 1994, p.4). Hence, Markov perfection is a stronger concept than subgame perfection does not rule out that strategies are made dependent on payoff-irrelevant histories. As a consequence, Markov perfection rules out any cooperation in a repeated game because the history of previous cooperation does
neither change the future action space nor the possible payoffs in this setting. Therefore, Markov perfection applied to repeated games implies the non-cooperative outcome in all stages of the game whereas cooperation can be sustained by strategies which guarantee subgame perfection but are not Markov.

It is the objective of this paper to demonstrate by a simple model that Markov perfection may not imply non-cooperation if repeated games are reformulated into simple dynamic games. This reformulation introduces a state variable which measures a degree of compliance which depends on past actions. This is not only a technical trick but acknowledges that agents suffer psychologically from past defection of a player from cooperation. The idea is that past defection changes the compliance state variable. This approach is able to explain cooperation as a Markov perfect equilibrium. A similar route was taken by the theory of household behavior in order to explain consumption plans which were inconsistent with stationary preferences (for the shaping papers, see Stigler, Becker, 1977, Becker, Murphy, 1988). This literature introduced household production functions which employed a human capital stock variable. In this paper, a stock variable is introduced which depends on the past compliance of the opponent and determines psychological costs of non-compliance. It is then interesting to explore how the stock-flow relationship must look like for different strategies in order to be able to sustain cooperation. As this paper defines a certain stock variable in order to make cooperation explainable, existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium is guaranteed by definition. In general, existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium is not guaranteed when a subgame-perfect equilibrium exists (see Hellwig, Leininger, 1988).

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the scope for potential cooperation in repeated game modelling for the trigger strategy, for a strategy which is weakly renegotiation-proof, and for the Markov perfect strategy. Section 4 redefines the repeated game as a dynamic game by introducing a compliance state variable. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The model

The model assumes an infinite-horizon game with two players $i$ and $j$ and finite action space under almost perfect information. The game starts in period 0. Players choose pure strategies and have to move simultaneously, i.e. being unaware of the other player's move, and each stage game is of the prisoners' dilemma type. The payoffs of each agent are a function of both players' actions and a state variable:

\[(1) \forall k \in \{i,j\}: U_k(t) = U_k[a_k(t), a_{-k}(t), C_k(t)]\]

\[\forall h_i: a_k(t) \in \{a_k^1, a_k^2, ..., a_k^m\}, \quad a_k^*, a_k^{**} \in \{a_k^1, a_k^2, ..., a_k^m\}\]

\[\forall a_k^* \in \{a_k^1, a_k^2, ..., a_k^m\}: \quad a_k^* < a_k^{**},\]

\[h_i := \left[ [a_i(0), a_j(0)], [a_i(1), a_j(1)], ..., [a_i(t-1), a_j(t-1)] \right],\]

\[\forall C_k(t) = \chi, \forall a_k^* \in \{a_k^1, a_k^2, ..., a_k^m\}:
U_k[a_k^*, a_{-k}, \chi] > U_k[a_k^*, a_{-k}, \chi] > U_k[a_k^*, a_{-k}, \chi],\]

\[U_k[a_k^*, a_{-k}^*, 0] = 0,\]

\[U_{kC_k} > 0, \quad U_{kC_{k^*}} = U_{kC_{k^*}} = 0.\]

$k$ is either $i$ or $j$, and $-k$ is the agent who is not $k$. $U_k$ denotes the utility, $a$ denotes actions and $C_k(t)$ is the state variable in agent $k$'s utility function. As usual, variables in subscripts denote the respective derivative. (1) specifies that independent of the history $h_i$ of the game each player may choose between non-cooperative behavior (denoted by a prime) and several actions of cooperative behavior. Any cooperative behavior out of the set of $m$ actions will be denoted by a star. The double star denotes any alternative cooperative action which will be used in section 4 in order to discuss strong renegotiation-proofness. (1) assumes that real numbers are assigned to non-cooperative behavior and all cooperative actions, and non-cooperative behavior falls
short of cooperative behavior. (1) ensures also that the stage game is always of the prisoners' dilemma type. Furthermore, (1) assumes that the marginal utility of the stock is positive, and that the utility function is strongly separable between actions and the state variable.\(^1\) Note that (1) does not assume that any representative cooperative action pair \([a^*_i,a^*_j]\) is Pareto-optimal but only that it Pareto-dominates the non-cooperative outcome.

Sections 3 and 4 will specify the relationship between actions and the stock variable. For potential cooperation in repeated games, the following individual histories will be employed:

\[
\begin{align*}
\hat{h}^k_{t-\tau} &:= [a_k(t-\tau), a_k(t-\tau+1), \ldots, a_k(t-1)], \\
h^k_{t-\tau} &:= \left[a_k(t-\tau) = a^*_k, a_k(t-\tau+1) = a^*_k, \ldots, a_k(t-1) = a^*_k\right], \\
h^k^*_{t-\tau} &:= \left[a_k(t-\tau) = a'_k, a_k(t-\tau+1) = a^*_k, \ldots, a_k(t-1) = a^*_k\right].
\end{align*}
\]

The superscript denotes the history of the respective player and the subscript reads individual history before \(t\) covering the last \(t - \tau\) periods. Hence, \(\tau = t\) covered the whole individual history of the game. The second history (denoted by a star) is a history of complete cooperation, and the third history (denoted by "\(^A\)") is a history of cooperation except in the first period under consideration. All individual histories are well-defined only for \(\tau \geq 1\).

A strategy in time as a sequence of actions will be denoted by \(\sigma\), and the discounted sum of utilities as a function of strategies will be denoted by \(\Omega\):

\(^1\) Strong separability implies that the utility function may be written as the sum of two functions,

\(U_k(t) = V_k[a_k(t), a_{-k}(t)] + W_k[h_k(t)],\)

such that

\(U_k[\hat{a}_k, \hat{a}_{-k}, \overline{C}_k] - U_k[\hat{a}_k, \hat{a}_{-k}, \overline{C}_k] = U_k[\hat{a}_k, \hat{a}_{-k}, \overline{C}_k] - U_k[\hat{a}_k, \hat{a}_{-k}, \overline{C}_k]\)

holds for all pairs \([\hat{a}_k, \hat{a}_{-k}], [\overline{C}_k, \overline{C}_{-k}]\) and \([\overline{C}_k, \overline{C}_{-k}]\).
\(\sigma_k(t) := \{s_k(t), s_k(t+1), \ldots\}, \quad \sigma_k^*(t) := \{s_k^*(t), s_k^*(t+1), \ldots\}\)

\[\Omega_k[\sigma_k(t), \sigma_{-k}(t)] := \sum_{\nu=1}^{\infty} \delta^{\nu-1} U_k[s_k(\nu), s_{-k}(\nu), C(\nu)]\]

\(\delta\) denotes the discount factor which is identical for both players. A strategy in time consists of actions \(s\) chosen for all future periods. \(\sigma\) without star denotes any strategy which is possible, \(\sigma^*\) denotes a strategy which is at least subgame-perfect:

\(\forall t:\ \Omega_k[\sigma_k^*(t), \sigma_{-k}^*(t)] \geq \Omega_k[\sigma_k(t), \sigma_{-k}(t)],\)

\[s_k^*(t), s_k(t) \in \{a_k, a_k^1, a_k^2, \ldots, a_k^m\}.
\]

(4) requires that the discounted sum of utilities of any alternative strategy must not exceed the discounted utility of \(\sigma^*\), given any strategy of the other agent (which is denoted by a tilde). Then, \([\sigma_k^*(t), \sigma_{-k}^*(t)]_0^t\) which fulfils (4) for all \(t\) gives the strategies of a subgame-perfect equilibrium.

As the action space is not changed by definition, only the discounted sum of utilities may be varied through the stock variable. Hence, a strategy is Markov if it depends only on the current value of the stock variable. Let two different paths of the dynamic system and the corresponding strategies be denoted by a prime and a double prime, respectively. A Markov perfect equilibrium requires

\(\forall k \in \{i, j\}: \quad C_k'(t) = C_k''(t), \quad \sigma_{-k}'(t) = \sigma_{-k}''(t)\)

\[\Rightarrow \quad \sigma_k''(t) = \sigma_k''(t).\]

3. Cooperation in repeated games

In repeated games, the stock variable in both players' utility functions does not change over time. For the sake of simplicity, modelling repeated games may assume that the state variable is set zero:
One of the simplest strategies is the trigger strategy. The trigger strategy wants an agent to start with cooperation unless the other agent has defected. If defection occurs, it triggers non-cooperative behavior for the whole future. (6) formalizes this strategy:

(6) \( \forall t: h_{i-1} = h_{i-1}^*; s_k(t) = a_k^*, \quad h_{i-1}^* \neq h_{i-1}^*: s_k(t) = a_k'. \)

The trigger strategy is successful if the gains from infinite cooperation do not fall short of the gains from cheating and no cooperation in all following periods. This condition is given by (7):

(7) \( \forall k \in \{i, j\}: \frac{1}{1-\delta} U_k[a_k^*, a_{-k}^*, 0] \geq U_k[a_k^*, a_{-k}'^*, 0]. \)

At least two arguments have cast doubts on the reliability of the trigger strategy to sustain cooperation. One argument firstly raised by Abreu (1988) criticized that reverting to the non-cooperative outcome may not suffice to support the cooperative outcome. Abreu discussed penal codes which substitute for reverting to the non-cooperative outcome. These penal codes specify a certain action profile to be taken in the case of defection of either agent, including defection from the penal code. Abreu demonstrated that penal codes may sustain more cooperation than the simple trigger strategy. Another argument which has received increasing attention in the literature concerns the credibility of the trigger strategy. The trigger strategy obviously assumes cooperation in the beginning but rules out any return to cooperation after one agent has defected. The credibility is in doubt because two agents have chosen strategies which start with cooperation but will revert to non-cooperation if one incidence of deviation occurs. The literature on renegotiation-proofness deals with the option that agents may reconsider their strategies and talk about revising their original plans after an agent has defected.

Discussing credibility of different strategies means asking the question how strong past events influence future behavior (see Farrell, Maskin, 1989, Mohr, 1988). On the
one hand, only the one-shot equilibrium can constitute an equilibrium in the
tsupergame if agents' decisions are supposed to be extremely history-independent such
that past events do not influence future behavior. This is the basis of Markov
perfection and is similar to the sunk cost argument that by-gones are by-gones. On the
other hand, an agent's strategy does strongly depend on past events if he denies any
cooperation if the other agent has defected in the past. In this case, an agent does not
forgive defection even if defection occurred, say, fifty years ago.

The concept of renegotiation-proofness lies in between these extreme approaches. As
Bernheim and Ray (1989) have put it, these concepts want an equilibrium not to "... prescire any course of action taken in any subgame that players would jointly wish to
renegotiate (given the restriction that any alternative must themselves be invulnerable
to subsequent renegotiation)" (p. 297). The concepts of renegotiation-proofness are
also history-dependent because punishment follows deviating behavior but they do
also allow both agents to restart cooperation. The option to restart cooperation makes
such strategies immune against renegotiations (i.e. renegotiation-proof) because these
strategies do not want both agents to realize the Pareto-inferior non-cooperative
utilities in all future periods. It is obvious that this compromise between the need for
punishing deviating behavior and the restart of cooperation potentially restricts the
scope for cooperation further compared to pure punishment strategies because a
potentially deviating agent anticipates restarting cooperation. Therefore, the
punishment threat may be weakened and renegotiation-proofness may impose stricter
restrictions on sustainable cooperation.

According to Farrell and Maskin (1989), an equilibrium is weakly renegotiation-proof
if none of its continuation payoffs is Pareto-dominated by another continuation payoff.
Continuation payoffs are the discounted sum of all present and future payoffs. Pareto-
dominance requires that these discounted values of payoffs which the strategies give
both agents after defection of an agent has occurred should not be Pareto-dominated
by any other strategy specification. A simple weakly renegotiation-proof strategy
specifies that the non-deviating agent reverts to the non-cooperative outcome until the deviating agent has chosen cooperative behavior unilaterally in one period (see van Damme, 1989). More generally, weak renegotiation-proofness may be assured by the specification that the non-deviating agent reverts to the non-cooperative outcome until the deviating agent has chosen cooperative behavior unilaterally in $n$ periods.

The specification of this weakly renegotiation-proof strategy for $n = \tau - 1 \geq 1$ is given in (8):

$$(8) \quad \forall t: \quad h_{t-\tau}^{\tau-k} \in \left\{ h_{t-\tau}^{\tau-k}, \hat{h}_{t-\tau}^{\tau-k} \right\}: \quad s_k(t) = a_k, \quad h_{t-\tau}^{\tau-k} \notin \left\{ h_{t-\tau}^{\tau-k}, \hat{h}_{t-\tau}^{\tau-k} \right\}: \quad s_k(t) = a'_{k}.$$ 

(8) specifies that agent $k$ always cooperates if agent $-k$ cooperates as well or if he has cooperated the last $\tau - 1$ periods. In all other cases, agent $k$ reverts to non-cooperation. When $-k$ has defected, he may therefore restart cooperation by choosing cooperative behavior unilaterally for $\tau - 1$ periods.

Compared to the trigger strategy, the deviating agent is better off if an investment into a restarting cooperation pays, and the non-deviating agent is better off as he enjoys $\tau - 1$ free rides and a restart of cooperation if the other agent wants to restart cooperation. In this case, the continuation payoffs Pareto-dominate the payoffs of reverting to the one-shot equilibrium forever and are not Pareto-dominated by returning to the original cooperation without punishment. For sufficiently high discount factors, the feasibility of Pareto-optimal outcomes was proved by Evans and Maskin (1989).

Obviously, weak renegotiation-proofness should still meet condition (7). If this condition did not hold, one agent would deliberately defect and deny any cooperation in the future. Additionally, two conditions have to be met which will be referred to as ex ante and ex post compliance. Ex ante compliance requires that it must not pay for an agent to defect in one period and to invest into a restarting cooperation in $\tau - 1$ periods compared to cooperation in these periods. Ex ante compliance does not suffice to satisfy weak renegotiation-proofness because a deviating agent must prefer to restart
cooperation after he has enjoyed defection benefits \((\text{ex post compliance})\). Additionally, the agent which was the victim of defection must benefit from this strategy specification compared to returning to cooperation without punishment, a condition which is always overfulfilled. All three conditions are given by (9):

\[
\forall k \in \{i, j\}: \\
\left[ 1 + \delta \frac{1 - \delta^{x-1}}{1 - \delta} \right] U_k[a^*_k, a^*_k, 0] - U_k[a^*_k, a^*_k, 0] - \delta \frac{1 - \delta^{x-1}}{1 - \delta} U_k[a^*_k, a^*_k, 0] \geq 0, \\
\frac{1 - \delta^{x-1}}{1 - \delta} U_k[a^*_k, a^*_k, 0] + \frac{\delta^{x-1}}{1 - \delta} U_k[a^*_k, a^*_k, 0] \geq 0, \\
\frac{1 - \delta^{x-1}}{1 - \delta} U_k[a^*_k, a^*_k, 0] + \frac{\delta^{x-1}}{1 - \delta} U_k[a^*_k, a^*_k, 0] \geq \frac{1}{1 - \delta} U_k[a^*_k, a^*_k, 0].
\]

In the first line, the first term gives the discounted value of cooperation in \(\tau\) periods, the second term gives the defection benefits and the third term gives the (negative) benefits from being punished in \(\tau - 1\) periods in order to restart cooperation. The second line of (9) requires that the benefits from investing into a restarting cooperation, i.e. being punished in \(\tau - 1\) periods, and the discounted value of cooperation must not fall short of refraining from restarting cooperation. The third line gives the redundant condition for the other agent.

If strategies should be independent of the payoff-irrelevant history, only the non-cooperative behavior in all periods constitutes an equilibrium:

\[
\forall h_t: \quad s_k(t) = a'_k.
\]

Because nothing has been changed by cooperation or non-cooperation, no Markov perfect strategy is able to sustain cooperation. This result stands in deep contrast to possible cooperation sustained by other solution concepts. The basic point is that repetition is by assumption stationary, and that cooperative or non-cooperative behavior in the past must make a difference for an agent when cooperation should be possible. Markov perfection requires that the irrelevance of past outcomes for current
payoffs should go along with the irrelevance of past outcomes on future behavior. The following section will demonstrate that a utility function which incorporates compliance of the other agent in the past is able to reconcile potential cooperation and Markov perfection.

4. Cooperation as a dynamic game

In prisoners' dilemma games under almost perfect information, every agent knows that cooperation is the more "honest" choice because it is at the risk to be exploited by non-cooperation of the other agent. When an agent has decided for cooperative behavior and non-cooperation of the other agent occurs, an agent can be expected not only to be worse off at the very moment of realization but also to be disappointed because the expected "cooperative mood" has disappeared. Because the mood may have an impact on a player's long-run utility, this section adopts the psychological assumption that being fooled by another agent does not leave the welfare of agents untouched. In this case, the game is not repeated but dynamic because past compliance with cooperative behavior affects the future welfare of an agent. This dynamic game is special because the dynamics do not change the action space but only the utility of the agent under consideration.

The last section has argued that the scope for cooperation depends on the influence of past actions on current behavior. According to Mohr (1988), the character of agents firstly deciding for cooperation and then refraining from cooperation must change dependent on past outcomes. Consistent behavior required that cooperation in repeated games and stationary preferences should result in non-cooperative behavior in all periods. But dynamic modelling may explain why an agent has changed into "another" agent after defection has occurred. Hence, one may conclude that cooperation sustained in repeated games may reflect the choice of history-dependent strategies
only incomplete because the impact of non-compliance on future welfare is taken into account only through the strategy choice.

The theory of household behavior took a quite similar route. Not being able to explain certain consumption paths by stationary preferences, the theory of household production functions introduced a state variable which depends on current and future consumption. For example, a household may increase its consumption of books substantially in the course of time because every book adds to the human capital of this household, and the marginal utility of books increases with human capital. In this paper here, the dynamic game is assumed to change the utility by the compliance state variable C.

Introducing a compliance state variable raises the question how the compliance stock variable changes with past behavior of the other agent. In general, one may model this stock-flow-relationship similar to an investment function such that the behavior of agent -k varies the stock variable of agent k. It is well known that investment or disinvestment may be either reversible or irreversible, and this section will discuss both investment options. Consider first an irreversible investment function:

(11) \( \forall k \in \{i,j\} \):

\[
C_k(t) = \min \left\{ [a_{-k}(0) - a^*_k], [a_{-k}(1) - a^*_k], \ldots, [a_{-k}(t - 1) - a^*_k] \right\},
\]

\( C_k(0) = 0. \)

In the beginning of the game, the compliance state variable of agent k is zero. Then, it may change to a negative value and if it has changed it cannot be brought back to zero. When the set of cooperative actions is a singleton, (11) implies that the compliance state variable may take only two values, and if it has taken the smaller one, this effect is a ratchet effect. (11) mirrors the state variable of an agent pursuing a trigger strategy policy. If defection has occurred, there is no way to bring him into a better mood but his mood is spoiled for the rest of the supergame.
One may conclude that the trigger strategy in repeated games is a substitute for a dynamic game in which defection makes an agent suffer without any option to make him happy again. Such investment is obviously possible for section 3's weakly renegotiation-proof strategy:

\[(12) \forall k \in \{i, j\}: C_k(t) = C_k(t-1) - (\tau - 1)[a_k^* - a_k]^t[a_k^* - a_{-k}(t-1)]^t + [a_k^* - a_k(t-1)][a_{-k}(t-1) - a_{-k}^*],\]

\[C_k(0) = 0.\]

(12) assumes the same starting value of C. Compared to (11), agent \(-k\) may disinvest and invest into agent \(k\)'s compliance state variable. If he defects, he reduces the state variable by \((\tau - 1)[a_k^* - a_k]^t[a_k^* - a_{-k}(t-1)]^t\). Then, he may invest into a better mood of agent by unilaterally behaving cooperatively in the subsequent \(\tau - 1\) periods because he adds \([a_k^* - a_k]^t[a_k^* - a_k(t-1)]^t\) per period if agent \(k\) chooses non-cooperation and he chooses cooperation.

In both cases, a Markov perfect strategy which follows (13) guarantees cooperation if (8) and (9) hold:

\[(13) \forall k \in \{i, j\}: s_k[C_k(t) \geq 0] = a_k^*, \quad s_k[C_k(t) < 0] = a_{-k}^*.\]

(13) is Markov because it depends only on the current state, and it is a perfect equilibrium because no agent can be better off by another strategy. For (11), (4) and (7) coincide, for (12), (4) and (8) coincide (note that the profitability of the strategy refers to the actions of the other agent \(-k\) for whom the compliance state variable remains zero). According to (13), an agent does not cooperate if his compliance state variable falls strictly short of zero, and he cooperates if this state variable is not negative. The rule is: If you are in a bad mood, do not cooperate, if you are in a good mood, cooperate. (12) and (13) give different definitions of the state variable with respect to investment and disinvestment over time. As agents are likely to forgive when the other agent has invested into cooperation, one may find that (13) is more
realistic. This line of reasoning goes along with the observation that both investment and disinvestment are more likely to be reversible.

Even more, one may expect that cooperation may also be invulnerable to renegotiations about cooperation. According to Farrell and Maskin (1989), an outcome is strongly renegotiation-proof if its continuation payoffs are not Pareto-dominated by another weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium. The idea is that an agent who has defected is able to make a new proposal which should substitute for punishment and restarting cooperation. If the outcome of this proposal gives higher utilities to both agents than punishment and restarting cooperation, they can be expected to accept this proposal and to refrain from punishment. The fatal implication of refraining from punishment is that punishment is made incredible because a potentially deviating agent anticipates that he will not be punished. If every weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium's punishment plan is Pareto-dominated by another weakly renegotiation-proof contract, no strongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium exists. But if defection has decreased the compliance state variable and an alternative equilibrium is not able to substitute for investment by unilateral cooperative actions, an alternative agreement may no longer to be superior because the expected gain from lowering C may overcompensate for not switching to another cooperation scheme.

This argument can be made clear using the condition for an equilibrium which is not strongly renegotiation-proof. Consider any alternative cooperative action pair $[a_k^*, a_{-k}^*]$ which can be supported as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium. (8) is not strongly renegotiation-proof if (14) holds:

$$\exists a_k^* \in \{a_1^1, a_1^2, ..., a_1^m\}, \quad \exists a_{-k}^* \in \{a_{-1}^1, a_{-1}^2, ..., a_{-1}^m\}:$$

$$\frac{1}{1-\delta} U_k[a_k^{**}, a_{-k}^{**}, \psi(0)] \geq \sum_{\omega=0}^{\tau-2} \delta^n U_k[a_k^*, a_{-k}^*, \psi(\omega)] + \frac{\delta^{\tau-1}}{1-\delta} U_k[a_k^*, a_{-k}^*, 0],$$

$$\frac{1}{1-\delta} U_k[a_k^{**}, a_{-k}^{**}, 0] \geq \frac{1-\delta^{\tau-1}}{1-\delta} U_k[a_k^*, a_{-k}^*, 0] + \frac{\delta^{\tau-1}}{1-\delta} U_k[a_k^*, a_{-k}^*, 0]$$
The first condition defines the preference of an agent to refrain from punishment: the term on the LHS gives the discounted sum of switching to an alternative cooperation scheme, the terms on the RHS give the discounted utility of punishment and restarting cooperation according to the original cooperation scheme. The constant $\psi(0)$ in the first term reflects that a new cooperation scheme is not able to reduce the psychological costs of past defection. The second condition defines the preference of the deviating agent to propose $a_{k}^{**}$ This condition does not depend on the compliance state variable but the first condition does. In a repeated game for which $C_k = 0$, this condition can be written as

$$\frac{1}{1-\delta}U_k[a_{k}^{**},a_{-k}^{**},0] \geq \frac{1-\delta^{t-1}}{1-\delta}U_k[a_{k}',a_{-k}',0] + \frac{\delta^{t-1}}{1-\delta}U_k[a_{k}^{*},a_{-k}^{*},0].$$

In the respective dynamic game, $\psi$ in (14) is not zero but starts with a negative value which is reduced to zero over time:

$$\psi(0) = -(\tau - 1)[a_{k}^{*} - a_{k}'][a_{-k}^{*} - a_{-k}'],$$

$$\psi(\omega + 1) - \psi(\omega) = [a_{k}^{*} - a_{k}'][a_{-k}^{*} - a_{-k}'].$$

(16) allows to rewrite the first condition in (14) as

$$U_k[a_{k}^{**},a_{-k}^{**},\psi(0)] - U_k[a_{k}',a_{-k}',\psi(0)]$$

$$+ \sum_{\omega=1}^{\tau-2}\delta^\omega \{U_k[a_{k}',a_{-k}',\psi(0)] - U_k[a_{k}',a_{-k}',\psi(\omega)]\}$$

$$+ \frac{\delta^{\tau-1}}{1-\delta}\{U_k[a_{k}^{*},a_{-k}^{*},\psi(0)] - U_k[a_{k}',a_{-k}',0]\} \geq 0.$$
it is smaller in the dynamic game than in the repeated game because the first term remains at \( \psi(0) \) (which makes \( U_k \) lower compared to a zero level) whereas the second term is increased over time because \( \psi(\omega) \) increases. The third difference is also smaller because the first term remains at \( \psi(0) \) whereas the second term is the same for repeated game and dynamic game modelling. Hence, (17) shows that dynamic modelling makes (14) more demanding compared to (15), and one may conclude that the dynamics of the game are likely to be more invulnerable to subsequent renegotiations compared to modelling in a purely repeated game.

5. Concluding remark

This paper has demonstrated that a dynamic modelling approach may sustain cooperation by Markov perfect strategies in situations which are usually modelled as repeated prisoners' dilemma games. A state variable was defined which depends on the other agent's compliance with cooperation. This state variable reflects the psychological costs of defection which are due to the mood of an agent, and a better (i.e. cooperative) mood was assumed to increase his utility. The paper has shown that the corresponding stock-flow-relationships differ: the trigger strategy implies a ratchet effect whereas a weakly renegotiation-proof strategy allows to invest into a restarting cooperation.

Three conclusions can be drawn: First, Markov perfection and cooperation do not necessarily contradict each other when past behavior changes a psychological stock variable. Second, it looks worth to test the different assumptions with respect to the underlying assumptions about the stock-flow relationship by experiments. Third, if evidence supports this approach, modelling in a repeated game framework with history-dependent strategies does not conflict with strict credibility conditions because it may be only a more simpler presentation of the problem at hand.
References


