Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320310 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Quantitative Economics [ISSN:] 1759-7331 [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] 3 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 655-697
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
Using rural household survey data from West Bengal, we find that voters respond positively to excludable government welfare benefits but not to local public good programs, while reporting having benefited from both. Consistent with these voting patterns, shocks to electoral competition induced by exogenous redistricting of villages resulted in upper-tier governments manipulating allocations across local governments only for excludable benefit programs. Using a hierarchical budgeting model, we argue these results provide credible evidence of the presence of clientelism rather than programmatic politics.
Subjects: 
Clientelism
public goods
voting
welfare programs
JEL: 
H40
H75
H76
O10
P48
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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