Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/27881 
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dc.contributor.authorBannier, Christina E.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-03-24-
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-10T14:00:42Z-
dc.date.available2009-09-10T14:00:42Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2009042200en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/27881-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the effects that heterogeneous multiple bank financing has on a firm's risk- and information-policy, particularly with respect to credit renegotiation efficiency. We find that a significant, yet limited, degree of relationship lending enables firms with high asset specificity to credibly signal their desire to abstain from strategic default. This allows the firm's policy to eliminate the risk of inefficient liquidation even in the case of bleak cash-flow expectations. This hold-up benefit comes at a cost, though: firms with low asset specificity cannot always eliminate the risk of coordination failure by their banks.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFrankfurt School of Finance & Management |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aFrankfurt School - Working Paper Series |x117en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleIs there a hold-up benefit in heterogeneous multiple bank financing?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn594628954en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:117en

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