Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/265948 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9913
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This paper examines the usefulness of Kalai (2020)'s measure of the viability of Nash equilibrium. We experimentally study a class of participation games, which differ in the number of players, the success threshold, and the payoff to not participating. We find that Kalai's measure captures well how the viability of the everyone-participates (eP) equilibrium depends on the success threshold; the measure does not capture other elements of the game which affect the likelihood that the eP equilibrium is played.
Subjects: 
Nash equilibrium
viability
laboratory experiments
coordination game
JEL: 
C00
C70
C92
D90
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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