Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/263755 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9825
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
In unavoidable traffic accidents, autonomous vehicles (AVs) face the dilemma of protecting either the passenger(s) or third parties. Recent studies show that most people prefer AVs following a utilitarian approach by minimizing total harm. At the same time, however, they would adopt an AV only if it prioritizes the passenger(s), i.e. themselves. As AVs exhibit a lower accident risk in the first place, a regulator therefore faces a trade-off: the harm-minimizing behavior of AVs (ex post efficiency) hampers the willingness to adopt them (ex ante efficiency). Using a game-theoretic model, we analyze how the second-best optimal level of AV passenger protection depends on (i) the AV safety advantage, (ii) the intensity of drivers' social preferences, and (iii) their reluctance to adopt AVs. A higher AV safety advantage may either increase or decrease the second best optimal level of passenger protection.
Subjects: 
autonomous vehicles
ethical dilemma
trolley problem
adoption of new technologies
game theory
JEL: 
O31
K23
L51
L62
R41
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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