Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/242984 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Experimental Economics [ISSN:] 1573-6938 [Volume:] 24 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer Science + Business Media B.V. [Place:] Dordrecht [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 434-488
Publisher: 
Springer Science + Business Media B.V., Dordrecht
Abstract: 
The paper surveys the experimental literature on centralized matching markets, covering school choice and college admissions models. In the school choice model, one side of the market (schools) is not strategic, and rules (priorities) guide the acceptance decisions. The model covers applications such as school choice programs, centralized university admissions in many countries, and the centralized assignment of teachers to schools. In the college admissions model, both sides of the market are strategic. It applies to college and university admissions in countries where universities can select students, and centralized labor markets such as the assignment of doctors to hospitals. The survey discusses, among other things, the comparison of various centralized mechanisms, the optimality of participants’ strategies, learning by applicants and their behavioral biases, as well as the role of communication, information, and advice. The main experimental findings considered in the survey concern truth-telling and strategic manipulations by the agents, as well as the stability and efficiency of the matching outcome.
Subjects: 
experiments
matching markets
school choice
college admissions
survey
JEL: 
C92
D47
D83
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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