Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/242984 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Experimental Economics [ISSN:] 1573-6938 [Volume:] 24 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer Science + Business Media B.V. [Place:] Dordrecht [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 434-488
Verlag: 
Springer Science + Business Media B.V., Dordrecht
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper surveys the experimental literature on centralized matching markets, covering school choice and college admissions models. In the school choice model, one side of the market (schools) is not strategic, and rules (priorities) guide the acceptance decisions. The model covers applications such as school choice programs, centralized university admissions in many countries, and the centralized assignment of teachers to schools. In the college admissions model, both sides of the market are strategic. It applies to college and university admissions in countries where universities can select students, and centralized labor markets such as the assignment of doctors to hospitals. The survey discusses, among other things, the comparison of various centralized mechanisms, the optimality of participants’ strategies, learning by applicants and their behavioral biases, as well as the role of communication, information, and advice. The main experimental findings considered in the survey concern truth-telling and strategic manipulations by the agents, as well as the stability and efficiency of the matching outcome.
Schlagwörter: 
experiments
matching markets
school choice
college admissions
survey
JEL: 
C92
D47
D83
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Dokumentart: 
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Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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