Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233248 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper No. 32
Publisher: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Abstract: 
We provide a simple characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of an alternating offers bargaining game when the number of players increases without a limit. Core convergence literature is emulated by increasing the number of players by replication. The limit allocation is interpreted in terms of Walrasian market for being the first proposer.
Subjects: 
non-cooperative bargaining
stationary equilibrium
replication
Walrasian market
JEL: 
C72
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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