Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/229472 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8654
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Gerrymandering undermines representative democracy by creating many uncompetitive legislative districts, and generating the very real possibility that a party that wins a clear majority of the popular vote does not win a majority of districts. We present a new approach to the determination of electoral districts, taking a design perspective. Specifically, we develop a redistricting game between two parties who both seek an advantage in upcoming elections, and show that we can achieve two desirable properties: First, the overall election outcome corresponds to the popular vote. Second, most districts are competitive.
Subjects: 
Gerrymandering
legislative elections
redistricting
JEL: 
D72
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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