Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201406 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1033
Version Description: 
August 2011, Updated version
Publisher: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Abstract: 
This article argues that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to control Somali piracy for four reasons. First, Somali piracy is a land-based problem and naval control mechanisms are not changing the incentives for pirates. Second, improving Somalia's anarchic political situation will not necessarily stop piracy. Our analysis demonstrates that piracy is a business which improves with a more stable operating environment. Third, piracy is organized criminal activity, and like other organized crime groups will be difficult to control, especially if it becomes embedded in state structures. Finally, we argue that few of the relevant players have any real incentives to alter their behaviour.
Subjects: 
Piracy
Somalia
Law Enforcement
Organised Crime
EU Atalanta
JEL: 
K42
O17
P48
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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