Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/201406 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1033
Versionsangabe: 
August 2011, Updated version
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
This article argues that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to control Somali piracy for four reasons. First, Somali piracy is a land-based problem and naval control mechanisms are not changing the incentives for pirates. Second, improving Somalia's anarchic political situation will not necessarily stop piracy. Our analysis demonstrates that piracy is a business which improves with a more stable operating environment. Third, piracy is organized criminal activity, and like other organized crime groups will be difficult to control, especially if it becomes embedded in state structures. Finally, we argue that few of the relevant players have any real incentives to alter their behaviour.
Schlagwörter: 
Piracy
Somalia
Law Enforcement
Organised Crime
EU Atalanta
JEL: 
K42
O17
P48
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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