Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/181366 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] New Political Economy [ISSN:] 1469-9923 [Volume:] 24 [Issue:] 6 [Publisher:] Routledge [Place:] London [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 735-758
Publisher: 
Routledge, London
Abstract: 
Existing theories make divergent predictions about the impact of new powers on the global political economy. Some argue that a more even distribution of power will erode international cooperation, while others argue that cooperation can continue with the help of international institutions to overcome collective action problems. We argue that this debate overlooks a critical determinant of the shape of power transitions: the distribution of preferences amongst the major powers. It is primarily in the context of divergent preferences that power transitions are likely to give rise to conflict. Moreover, even where preferences diverge, the gains of cooperation provide a strong incentive to continue to pursue goals through multilateralism. This situation leads to forms of institutional change unanticipated by established theories. These include 'deadlock' in expansive multilateral fora, institutional 'drift' as old rules cannot keep up with the changing political and economic context, and 'fragmentation' as countries seek minilateral solutions that reduce preference diversity. We develop this preference-based, institutional argument by examining the distribution of preferences and institutional change at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Doha Round, where the power transition is relatively advanced.
Subjects: 
BRICS
Doha round
fragmentation
global governance
power shift
preferences
rising powers
World Trade Organization
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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