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## New Powers and the Distribution of Preferences in Global Trade Governance: From Deadlock and Drift to Fragmentation

New Political Economy

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## **Matthew D. Stephen and Michal Parížek: Online appendix**

### **Underlying Data**

The underlying raw data for this paper is available from the authors upon request.

### **Coding Scheme**

Here we describe the coding scheme used for the assessment of BICS' and G7s' positions in the Doha round. On the technical level, the coding scheme reflects the coder's answer, based on his/her reading of the ministerial statement text, to the following question: "[According to the statement by country X,] should deep new regulation be adopted in the given area, leading to the restriction of policy space and to significant trade liberalization?" Code value 0 indicates the answer 'strongly disagree', while value 4 indicates answer 'strongly agree'. The intermediate values 1, 2, and 3, indicate answers 'disagree', 'neither agree nor disagree', and 'agree', respectively. Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the coding scheme with examples, as well as the codes frequency distribution.

There are two important limitations of the data used. First, most ministers do not mention all the topics on all the conferences, in fact mostly only several are mentioned each time. Consequently, to obtain a reasonably complete dataset of positions, we work with aggregates across the entire period of 15 years, 1996-2011. This is in any case consistent with our analytical interest, which concerns relatively long time frames.

Second, an obvious disadvantage of the dataset is that the coding procedure is never perfectly precise, and is always to some extent a matter of interpretation. The coding of the BICS and G7 members' positions has been performed by one of the authors of the article. In order to assess our

coding scheme reliability, we conducted an inter-coder reliability assessment where we randomly selected one country from the BICS group and one from G7 to be independently re-coded by a research assistant. The results of the reliability assessment reflect the partial subjectivity of the coding on the level of individual statements but also the fact that the subjectivity tends to disappear when aggregated data are used, as in our case. On the level of individual ministerial statements, the Krippendorff alpha, ranging theoretically from 0 to 1, reaches a satisfactory level of 0.84 when the variable capturing WTO members' positions is treated as being measured on interval level (and 0.7 when treated as ordinal-level variable).<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, at points the two coders disagreed on whether a code indicating a pro-liberalization stance should be at all assigned, so for one coder an indication of preference was present in the text while for the other coder it was not clear enough to assign a specific code. Hence, the coding procedure is not reliable enough to warrant a direct use of the individual statements, for instance for the creation of panel data. On the other hand, the inter-coder reliability assessment gives very strong results when each country's aggregate data (averages) across all the ministerial conferences are considered. Here the Krippendorff alpha reaches a level of 0.98 (interval-level treatment) and 0.85 (ordinal-level treatment). For these aggregated data, the average difference of the two coders' assessment of countries' positions amounts to 0.15. We deem such a difference, on a scale between 0 and 4, more than acceptable, especially given that only aggregate values are used in this particular analysis. Once again, since only the country-level aggregates are used in the analysis in this article, we are confident that the values obtained and used constitute sufficiently

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<sup>1</sup> Each ministerial statement typically contains one political claim, but on occasions two or more claims can be present in one statement. The inter-coder reliability assessment was performed on the level of statements. We used the {irr} library of the R package to calculate the Krippendorff alpha values, see <http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/irr/irr.pdf> [accessed 8. 7. 2015]. For discussion of the measure, see Krippendorff 2004.

precise approximations of the states' positions, permitting systematic comparison of the BICS and G7 groups.

Code value	Question: Should deep new regulation be adopted in the given area, leading to the restriction of policy space and to significant trade liberalization?	Illustrative example
0	Strongly disagree	The need for a multilateral agreement on investment (...) is not clear. It can neither promise additional investment flows nor reduce transaction costs for investors significantly. However, an agreement will certainly curtail the policy space of developing countries. [India 2003, Singapore issues]
1	Disagree	Agriculture is the foundation of society in every country, and it provides a variety of functions that are beneficial to the society. As there are differences in the natural conditions and the historical background from one country to another, I think that the diversity and coexistence of agriculture among various countries need to be preserved. Various functions of agriculture towards different non-trade concerns, such as food security, rural development and the environment, cannot be obtained through foreign trade but only through agricultural activities in each country. [Japan 2003, agriculture]
2	Neither agree nor disagree	In relation to market access (...) significant trade barriers in the form of tariff peaks and tariff escalation continue to affect many developing country exports. These will clearly need to be squarely addressed. Meanwhile, sensitive industries in developing countries including small scale industries sustaining a large labour force cannot be allowed to be destroyed. [India 2001, NAMA]
3	Agree	We must continue to ensure that the WTO leads the way in examining issues of vital relevance to a healthy global trading system - issues such as new market access, fish subsidies, food security, trade facilitation, and regional trade agreements. [United States 2011, several areas]
4	Strongly agree	Subsidies and barriers in developed countries suppress prices, displace production and threaten livelihoods in developing nations. This is where reform is most needed, and most urgently. Rich countries cannot expect to receive payment for doing what they should have done long ago. After so many years – should I say decades or centuries? – remnants of feudalism have been lingering on side by side with other forms of unacceptable privileges. Poor countries cannot wait for another 20 years to see true reform in agricultural trade. The time to act is now. All forms of distorting subsidies have to be eliminated or drastically reduced. [Brazil 2005, agriculture]

**Table A1: The coding scheme overview with examples**

Country	Agriculture	NAMA	Services	Singapore Issues	Total count
BRA	7	2	2	1	<b>12</b>
CAN	8	6	7	6	<b>27</b>
DEU	5	8	4	5	<b>22</b>
FRA	6	3	6	6	<b>21</b>
GBR	2	5	2	4	<b>13</b>
CHN	3	2	1	1	<b>7</b>
IND	8	6	4	5	<b>23</b>
ITA	5	9	3	7	<b>24</b>
JPN	5	5	3	7	<b>20</b>
USA	13	8	11	7	<b>39</b>
ZAF	7	5	1	2	<b>15</b>
Total count	<b>69</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>223</b>

**Table A2: The coding scheme frequencies: number of coded claims across countries and areas**