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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No. 277
Verlag: 
Sveriges Riksbank, Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
Market distress can be the catalyst of a deleveraging wave, as in the 2007/08 financial crisis. This paper demonstrates how market distress and deleveraging can fuel each other in the presence of adverse selection problems in asset markets. At the core of the detrimental feedback loop is agents' desire to reduce their reliance on distressed asset markets by decreasing their leverage which in turn amplifies the adverse selection problem in asset markets. In the extreme case, this leads to a market breakdown. I find that adverse selection creates both an "ex-ante" inefficiency because it distorts agents' long-term leverage choices and an "interim" inefficiency because it distorts agents' short-term liquidity management. I derive important implications for central bank policy.
Schlagwörter: 
Leverage
endogenous borrowing constraints
financial crisis
liquidity
asymmetric information
central bank policy
JEL: 
D82
E58
G01
G20
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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