|
EconStor >
University of Oslo >
Department of Economics, University of Oslo >
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63020
|
| | |
| Title: | | Cream skimming, dregs skimming, and pooling: On the dynamics of competitive screening  |
| Authors: | | Lund, Diderik Nilssen, Tore |
| Issue Date: | | 2000 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2000,39 |
| Abstract: | | We discuss the prevalence of pooling equilibria in a two-period model of an insurance market with asymmetric information. We solve the model numerically. In addition to reporting cases where a pooling equilibrium exists, we pay attention to why, in the case of non-existence of a pooling equilibrium, this is so. In addition to the phenomenon of cream skimming emphasized in earlier literature, we here point to the the importance of the opposite: dregs skimming, whereby high-risk consumers are profitably detracted from the candidate pooling contract. |
| JEL: | | D82 G22 L14 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63020
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|