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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58378
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| Title: | | Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games  |
| Authors: | | Bonanno, Giacomo |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 11,11 |
| Abstract: | | We discuss a number of conceptual issues that arise in attempting to capture, in dynamic games, the notion that there is common understanding among the players that they are all rational. |
| Subjects: | | belief revision common belief counterfactual dynamic game model of a game rationality |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis
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