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Title:Every symmetric 3 x 3 global game of strategic complementarities is noise independent PDF Logo
Authors:Basteck, Christian
Daniëls, Tijmen R.
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:SFB 649 discussion paper 2010-061
Abstract:We prove that the global game selection in all 3 x 3 payoff-symmetric supermodular games is independent of the noise structure. As far as we know, all other proofs of noise independence of such games rely on the existence of a so-called monotone potential (MP) maximiser. Our result is more general, since some 3 x 3 symmetric supermodular games do not admit an MP maximiser. Moreover, a corollary is that noise independence does not imply the existence of an MP maximiser.
Subjects:global games
noise independence
JEL:C72
D82
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:SFB 649 Discussion Papers, HU Berlin

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