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|Title:||Robustness to strategic uncertainty in price competition |
Weibull, Jörgen W.
|Issue Date:||2010 |
|Series/Report no.:||SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 726|
|Abstract:||We model a player's uncertainty about other player's strategy choices as probability distributions over their strategy sets. We call a strategy profile robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in each of which every player's strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the pthers. We apply this definition to Bertrand games with a continuum of equilibrium prices and show that our robustness criterion selects a unique Nash equilibrium price. This selection agrees with available experimental findings.|
|Document Type:||Working Paper|
|Appears in Collections:||SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics|
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