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Title:Field and lab convergence in poissin LUPI games PDF Logo
Authors:Östling, Robert
Wang, Joseph Tao-yi
Chou, Eileen
Camerer, Colin F.
Issue Date:2007
Series/Report no.:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 671
Abstract:Game theory is usually difficult to test precisely in the field because predictions typically depend sensitively on features that are not controlled or observed. We conduct one such test using field data from the Swedish lowest unique positive integer (LUPI) game. In the LUPI game, players pick positive integers and whoever chose the lowest unique number wins a fixed prize. Theoretical equilibrium predictions are derived assuming Poisson-distributed uncertainty about the number of players, and tested using both field and laboratory data. The field and lab data show similar patterns. Despite various deviations from equilibrium, there is a surprising degree of convergence toward equilibrium. Some of the deviations from equilibrium can be rationalized by a cognitive hierarchy model.
Subjects:Population uncertainty
Poisson game
guessing game
experimental methods
behavioral game theory
level-k
cognitive hierarchy
JEL:C72
C92
C93
L83
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics

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