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Title:A numerical analysis of the evolutionary stability of learning rules PDF Logo
Authors:Josephson, Jens
Issue Date:2001
Series/Report no.:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 474
Abstract:In this paper I define an evolutionary stability criterion for learning rules. Using Monte Carlo simulations, I then apply this criterion to a class of learning rules that can be represented by Camerer and Ho's (1999) model of learning. This class contains perturbed versions of reinforcement and belief learning as special cases. A large population of individuals with learning rules in this class are repeatedly rematched for a finite number of periods and play one out of four symmetric two-player games. Belief learning is the only learning rule which is evolutionarily stable in almost all cases, whereas reinforcement learning is unstable in almost all cases. I also find that in certain games, the stability of intermediate learning rules hinges critically on a parameter of the model and the relative payoffs.
Subjects:Bounded rationality
Evolutionary game theory
Evolutionary Stability
Learning in games
Belief learning
Reinforcement learning
JEL:C72
C73
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics

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