Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56285 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 474
Verlag: 
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper I define an evolutionary stability criterion for learning rules. Using Monte Carlo simulations, I then apply this criterion to a class of learning rules that can be represented by Camerer and Ho's (1999) model of learning. This class contains perturbed versions of reinforcement and belief learning as special cases. A large population of individuals with learning rules in this class are repeatedly rematched for a finite number of periods and play one out of four symmetric two-player games. Belief learning is the only learning rule which is evolutionarily stable in almost all cases, whereas reinforcement learning is unstable in almost all cases. I also find that in certain games, the stability of intermediate learning rules hinges critically on a parameter of the model and the relative payoffs.
Schlagwörter: 
Bounded rationality
Evolutionary game theory
Evolutionary Stability
Learning in games
Belief learning
Reinforcement learning
JEL: 
C72
C73
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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