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Title:Epistemic robustness of sets closed under rational behavior PDF Logo
Authors:Asheim, Geir
Voorneveld, Mark
Weibull, Jörgen W.
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 714
Abstract:This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies.
Subjects:epistemic game theory
epistemic robustness
rationalizability
closedness under rational behavior
mutual p-belief
JEL:C72
D83
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, EFI - The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics

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