Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55537
Authors: 
Balduzzi, Paolo
Graziano, Clara
Luporini, Annalisa
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3732
Abstract: 
A small committee has to approve/reject a project with uncertain return. Members have different preferences: some are value-maximizers, others are biased towards approval. We focus on the efficient use of scarce information when communication is not guaranteed, and we provide insights on the optimal committee composition. We show that the presence of biased members can improve the voting outcome by simplifying the strategies of unbiased members. Thus, heterogeneous committees perform at least as well as homogeneous committees. In particular, when value-maximizers outnumber biased members by one vote, the optimal equilibrium becomes unique. Finally, allowing members to communicate brings no improvement.
Subjects: 
voting
small committees
committees composition
communication in committees
JEL: 
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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