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dc.contributor.authorBhattacharya, Souraven_US
dc.contributor.authorDeb, Joyeeen_US
dc.contributor.authorKundu, Tapasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-15T17:37:58Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-15T17:37:58Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55344-
dc.description.abstractWe study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, two groups compete for the right to allocate societys resources, and we allow for costly intergroup mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, that the opposition can either accept, or reject and wage conflict. Expropriating a large share of resources increases political strength by attracting opposition members, but such economic exclusion implies lower per capita shares and higher risk of conflict. In equilibrium, allocations are non-monotonic in the cost of mobility. Moreover, limited commitment with respect to mobility gives rise to inefficient conflict in equilibrium.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Public Choice 3699en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.jelP48en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordconflicten_US
dc.subject.keywordinter-group mobilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordresource allocationen_US
dc.subject.stwInteressengruppentheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWechselkostenen_US
dc.subject.stwKonflikten_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleMobility and conflicten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn685223809en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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