Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49866
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHarrington, Joseph E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorZhao, Weien_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-27T15:18:19Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-27T15:18:19Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49866-
dc.description.abstractIn the context of an infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, we explore how cooperation is initiated when players communicate and coordinate through their actions. There are two types of players - patient and impatient - which are private information. An impatient type is incapable of cooperative play, while if both players are patient types - and this is common knowledge - then they can cooperate with a grim trigger strategy. We find that the longer that players have gone without cooperating, the lower is the probability that they'll cooperate in the next period. While the probability of cooperation emerging is always positive, there is a positive probability that cooperation never occurs.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aJohns Hopkins Univ., Dep. of Economics |cBaltimore, Md.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking papers // the Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics |x559en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleTacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemmaen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn635251558en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

Files in This Item:
File
Size
296.18 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.