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CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49691
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| Title: | | Bargaining in legislatures: A new donation paradox  |
| Authors: | | Montero, Maria |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CeDEx discussion paper series 2010-19 |
| Abstract: | | It is well known that proposers have an advantage in the canonical model of bargaining in legislatures: proposers are sure of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in a coalition, a player receives more as a proposer than as a coalition partner. In this paper I show that, if parties differ in voting weight, it is possible for a party to donate part of its proposing probability to another party and be better-off as a result. This can happen even if the recipient never includes the donor in its proposals. Even though actually being the proposer is valuable, having a higher probability of being proposer may be harmful. |
| Subjects: | | legislative bargaining weighted majority games voting paradoxes |
| JEL: | | C78 D72 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham
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