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Title:Bargaining in legislatures: A new donation paradox PDF Logo
Authors:Montero, Maria
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:CeDEx discussion paper series 2010-19
Abstract:It is well known that proposers have an advantage in the canonical model of bargaining in legislatures: proposers are sure of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in a coalition, a player receives more as a proposer than as a coalition partner. In this paper I show that, if parties differ in voting weight, it is possible for a party to donate part of its proposing probability to another party and be better-off as a result. This can happen even if the recipient never includes the donor in its proposals. Even though actually being the proposer is valuable, having a higher probability of being proposer may be harmful.
Subjects:legislative bargaining
weighted majority games
voting paradoxes
JEL:C78
D72
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, The University of Nottingham

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